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INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA: 
DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISPOSSESSION 
NICHOLAS OLMSTED∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Central Kalahari Game Reserve, one of the largest conserved areas 
in Africa, encompasses tens of thousands of square kilometers of arid 
lands in Botswana that for millenia have been inhabited by San groups 
indigenous to southern Africa. Despite the ancient and close relationship 
between the San and the Kalahari region, the government of Botswana has 
provoked international outcry by progressively expelling San communities 
from the Reserve, placing them in dilapidated settlement camps, and 
issuing licenses for diamond prospecting to a multinational mining 
concern backed by the World Bank Group’s International Finance 
Corporation.1 San groups, human rights NGOs, and others have mobilized 
in response to the crisis and have brought the government to the 
negotiating table and the Botswana High Court.2 The outcome of this 
confrontation remains to be seen, but a resolution is unlikely to be lasting 
or effective unless the government, civil society and the international 
community come to grips with the deeper, structural aspects of San 
subordination in Botswana.  
Botswana’s experience underscores how the pursuit of national 
development and democratization, even if successful along other 
dimensions, is likely to fail indigenous groups when not accompanied by 
recognition of indigenous rights and acknowledgement of the effects of 
legally-supported inequality. The San have largely been denied the fruits 
of Botswana’s rapid economic growth and social development, suffering 
from chronic unemployment and poverty, holding little land and few 
assets, and frequently depending on government beneficence for survival.3 
At the same time, dynamics such as the conversion of land for grazing and 
 ∗ Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Washington, D.C. I would like to thank 
Shirley Huey, my parents, and Professor Benedict Kingsbury. Any errors or omissions are wholly my 
responsibility.  
 1. See discussion infra pp. 804–07. 
 2. See discussion infra notes 280–81 and accompanying text. See also San People to Challenge 
Eviction in Botswana Court, AFROL NEWS, June 1, 2004, http://www.afrol.com/ articles/13008. 
 3. See discussion infra at p. 802 and accompanying notes. 
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extractive uses have created grave threats to the San’s traditional 
activities.4 These contemporary problems, however, cannot be fully 
understood without tracing their roots in the customary, and subsequently 
formal, legal and political organization of pre-colonial Tswana chiefdoms 
and then the Bechuanaland Protectorate.  
Under Tswana rule, the San were subjugated as serfs and excluded 
from the political community.5 Although the British-controlled 
Bechuanaland Protectorate formally abolished serfdom, in other respects it 
exacerbated the inequities between San and Tswana groups by establishing 
a two-tier land and governance framework that gave the dominant Tswana 
tribes substantial autonomy to enforce their own customary law while 
denying the San similar recognition. The Protectorate provided protection 
for San land rights only through a London-conceived conservation 
framework that provided insecure tenure.6 The post-independence nation 
building enterprise of the Republic of Botswana has not rectified these 
problems, in part because of the shortcomings of land reform, the 
enactment of increasingly burdensome hunting regulations, and a focus on 
assimilating the San into the Tswana-dominated mainstream, rather than 
on giving them control over the projects and policies that affect them.7 
Finally, the article discusses applicable international human rights norms, 
including those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and sets 
forth an argument for the viability of an aboriginal title claim to San lands 
in Botswana.  
II. THE EXCLUSION OF THE SAN FROM THE BENEFITS OF BOTSWANA’S 
TRANSFORMATION 
Botswana’s democratization and diamond-driven growth have brought 
it acclaim as a salutary exception to the “resource curse” that locks 
resource-rich developing countries into a cycle of poverty, governmental 
corruption, and economic stagnation. Botswana’s economy, a large 
proportion of which is constituted by the mining sector,8 expanded at a 
torrid pace from independence to the late 1990s. Between 1966 and 1991, 
 4. See discussion infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra pp. 815–17. 
 6. See infra pp. 818–57. 
 7. See discussion infra pp. 837–50 and accompanying notes. 
 8. In recent years, mining has accounted for anywhere from 30–50% of Botswana’s GDP. See 
Maria Sarraf & Moortaza Jiwanji (World Bank), Beating the Resource Curse: The Case of Botswana 
10 (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org. 
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its economy grew at a remarkable annualized rate of thirteen percent 
(13%), and by 1991 its real per capita income stood at five times the 
average for sub-Saharan African countries.9 The World Bank estimates 
that Botswana’s 1966–1996 per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate was the highest in the world, exceeding even the rates of the 
East Asian economies.10 Botswana is also lauded for having one of the 
most transparent, democratic, and well-managed governments in the 
developing world, and has one of the longest-running constitutional 
democracies in Africa.11 In a continent possessing many states with a 
history of corruption, autocracy, and economic mismanagement, Botswana 
has benefited from “a relatively coherent leadership, with traditional 
legitimacy, education, business acumen,” and “a strong civil service, 
governed through recognized institutions rather than personal deals,” 
which together have sustained electoral democracy, enabled debate in 
government, and responsibly handled dealings with foreign corporations 
and management of state enterprises.12 Although gains have been 
substantially curtailed because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, Botswana 
through the late 1990s achieved major improvements in human 
development.13  
 9. Botswana Human Development Report 2000: Towards an AIDS Free Generation, U.N. 
Development Programme, at 16 (2000), at http://www.bw.undp.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2004) 
[hereinafter Botswana Human Developement Report 2000]. 
 10. J. Clark Leith (World Bank), Botswana: A Case Study of Economic Policy Prudence and 
Growth 1 (1999), at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_TBANK_Servlet?pcont=details& 
eid=000094946_00011405343417 (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). Economic growth slowed during the 
1990s but still reached an annual rate of approximately 5%.  
 11. TIYANJANA MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 121 (1999) 
 12. FREDERICK COOPER, AFRICA SINCE 1940: THE PAST OF THE PRESENT 183 (2002). Botswana 
also has one of the highest proportions of wildlife conservation land in the world, with about forty 
percent under some kind of protection. Kenneth Good, At the Ends of the Ladder: Radical Inequalities 
in Botswana, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 203, 223 (1993), available at http://www.jstor.org (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2000). 
 13. By 1996, Botswana ranked third among sub-Saharan countries in terms of the UN Human 
Development Index. See Botswana Human Development Report 2000, supra note 9, at 111 (1996). 
Education enrollment rates increased by over five percent per year, and, before the onset of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, major progress was made in measures of health as well. Although Botswana’s 
high level of inequality improved only marginally, it dropped somewhat in rural areas from the mid 
1970s to the mid 1990s. Leith, supra note 10, at 6. The incidence rate of poverty significantly declined 
through 1999, infant mortality fell from 108/1000 in 1966 to 38/1000 in 1999, and primary school 
enrollment increased from 50% to 97% in the same period. Country Programme Outlines for 
Botswana (2003–2007), United Nations Development Programme, U.N. Doc. DP/CPO/BOT/1 (2002), 
at 2, available at www.unbotswana.org.bw/ordp/docs/Botswana.CPO.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
Major gains also occurred in life expectancy, literacy, secondary school enrollment, child nutrition, 
and access to health care and clean water. See African Development Bank Data for Botswana, at 
http://www.afdb.org/knowledge/statistics/statistics_indicators_selected/country_tables/pdf/botswana. 
pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); Botswana Human Development Report 2000, supra note 9. The 
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Notwithstanding Botswana’s extensive success in promoting 
development and democracy, the San have been denied many of the 
benefits. Many San in Botswana continue to be poor, with high 
unemployment rates, high infant mortality, high incarceration rates, low 
literacy levels, and few assets.14 Although serfdom was formally 
eliminated by the middle of the twentieth century, San continue to be paid 
low wages for the farm labor in which many of them engage,15 and “many 
. . . are at least partially and sometimes totally dependent on livestock 
owners for their subsistence and income.”16 The average wage for farm 
and cattle post workers is “considerably below” what would sustain their 
families, leading many of them to supplement their incomes through 
foraging, food production, the sale of crafts and other goods, and 
government transfers.17 High inequality, among other factors, has impeded 
poverty reduction in rural areas, particularly those with large San 
populations.18 Poverty is “especially severe in the Ghanzi, Kgalagadi, and 
Ngamiland districts,” which traditionally contain large San populations.19 
The rural poverty rate of fifty-five percent (55%) is nearly twice the urban 
rate, an imparity that also exists with regard to social development 
indicators.20 
It is also clear that Botswana’s transformation over the last several 
decades, regardless of its benefits, has had some highly negative effects on 
San groups. A 1992 letter from the San NGO First People of the Kalahari 
to the government declared that “twenty-six years of independence have 
brought Botswana forward and us, The First People of the Kalahari, 
HIV/AIDS pandemic has had a catastrophic effect, however, and is undoing much of the progress 
achieved in the last several decades. In 2000 an estimated thirty-six percent of Botswana citizens 
between fifteen and forty-nine years of age were infected with HIV/AIDS. Id. at 1.  
 14. See ROBERT K. HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES: BUSHMEN AND THE POLITICS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 18 (1996); Robert K. Hitchcock, The Politics and Economics of 
Bureaucratic and Ethnic Identity Among Remote Area Populations in Botswana, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE KHOISAN IDENTITIES AND CULTURAL HERITAGE CONFERENCE 303, 309 (Andrew Bank ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter KHOISAN IDENTITIES]. 
 15. See Good, supra note 12, at 218. 
 16. See Hitchcock, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14. 
 17. Id. The Remote Area Development Programme has brought benefits such as access to water, 
schools, credit, health posts and other services, but it has not raised the social or economic status of the 
San, according to the San and those who work with them. Yet, the government may be scaling the 
Programme back. Id. at 310–11. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Botswana Human Development Report 2000, supra note 9, at 16.  
 20. Id. at 17. UNDP estimates that the Human Poverty Index (which incorporates data on 
illiteracy, lack of access to water and health services, child mortality, and child underweight) was 21.9 
and 14.5 for the eastern urban centers Gaborone and Francistown, whereas it was 45.0 for Ghanzi and 
44.8 for Kgalagadi South. Id. at 67, tbl. A4.3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/4
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backwards.”21 Large tracts of land once used for hunting and gathering 
have been allocated for grazing, pushing those who wish to continue 
traditional lifestyles farther into shrinking veld areas.22 Declining animal 
populations caused by habitat degradation and globalized markets for 
game have induced the government to constrain further San hunting 
practices in the last ten years.23 Botswana’s efforts to use social policy in 
order to improve conditions for the San have been plagued by problems 
and mistakes and have increased dependence on bureaucratic structures 
rather than on self-sufficiency or autonomy. 
Perhaps the most prominent among problems in the government’s 
relations with the San have been those concerning the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve (CKGR). The CKGR was created in 1961, shortly before 
Botswana’s independence, with the aim of protecting dwindling wildlife 
populations in the Kalahari. Though the matter is disputed, it was possibly 
also created to protect lands for the San. The CKGR’s over 52,000 square 
kilometers of land in the Ghanzi district include areas traditionally 
inhabited by the G/we and G//ana. Although residents of the CKGR were 
relatively undisturbed for the first decades of its existence, the government 
imposed major changes in the 1980s and 1990s that deeply affected the 
San. The government announced in 1986 that henceforth the Remote Area 
Dweller settlements should be made outside the CKGR.24 The commission 
 21. Letter from First People of the Kalahari to the Botswana Ministry of Local Government, 
Lands and Housing (May 17, 1992), quoted in SIDSEL SAUGESTAD, THE INCONVENIENT INDIGENOUS: 
REMOTE AREA DEVELOPMENT IN BOTSWANA, DONOR ASSISTANCE AND THE FIRST PEOPLE OF THE 
KALAHARI 178 (2001). 
 22. Good, for example, notes that in the Ghanzi district in the late 1980s approximately 2400 
square kilometers, or 1.7% of the district, had been allocated for Remote Area Dwellers who 
constituted forty-two percent of the district’s population, whereas almost 19,000 square kilometers had 
been acquired by commercial ranchers through the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. See Good, supra note 
12, at 215. 
 23. In 1992, the government passed the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act, which 
gave the President new powers to abolish or create game reserves, sanctuaries and wildlife 
management areas. It also imbued the minister of parks and wildlife with the power to create or 
abolish controlled hunting areas. Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act (Act No. 28 of 1992), 
available at www.igc.apc.org/envLaw/africa/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). The Act 
empowered the parks and wildlife minister to issue regulations on the provision of Special Game 
Licenses (SGLs) “to citizens of Botswana who are principally dependent on hunting and gathering 
veld products for their food.” Id. § 30(1). The SGLs specify the type and number of animals that can 
be killed. Id. Licensing officers, however, grew increasingly reluctant to issue SGLs to those in the 
Remote Area Development Programme. The Ngamiland and Kgaligadi districts stopped issuing SGLs 
by the late 1990s, and by 1998, “only people in the Ghanzi District were slated to receive [SGLs].” 
Robert K. Hitchcock, Hunting is Our Heritage: The Struggle for Hunting and Gathering Rights 
Among the San of Southern Africa, at http://www.kalaharipeoples.org/documents/Hunt-iwg.htm 
(observing that as of 2000 none of the remaining communities in the CKGR had been able to obtain 
hunting licenses) [hereinafter Hitchcock, Hunting is Our Heritage]. 
 24. See Robert K. Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies: The Politics of Resource Rights 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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did not include any residents of the CKGR, and several commission 
members objected to the failure to consult local groups, who in turn 
vigorously protested the policy once it was announced.25 A report from the 
American Anthropological Association observed that “local people reacted 
strongly to this request, arguing that they should be allowed to stay where 
they are,” and that the CKGR was originally established to protect the land 
and resource rights of central Kalahari inhabitants.26 The government 
justified its new policy on the grounds that it was too expensive to provide 
social services in the remote CKGR, that wildlife conservation would 
otherwise suffer, and that development assistance could be more 
effectively provided in locations with more transportation infrastructure. 
In the 1990s the government used increasingly coercive methods to induce 
residents to move, including resettlement.27 The NGOs Ditshwanelo and 
the Botswana Center for Human Rights note that most residents of the 
CKGR did not want to move from the reserve.28 Although the government 
promised compensation and increased benefits for those moving out of the 
reserve, residents allege that the government has failed to carry out its 
promises.29 
Among the Central Kalahari San, at http://kalaharipeoples.org/documents/Fpk-ckg.htm (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies]. “On July 15, 1986 a Botswana 
Government white paper on remote area dweller (RAD) settlements in the CKGR stated that the 
government of Botswana policy was that existing settlements should be relocated in areas outside of 
the reserve. The Honorable Moutlakgola Nwako, Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced the 
Government’s decision to have the communities move out of [CKGR] on October 12, 1986.” Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See American Anthropological Association, Human Rights, Development, and the Peoples of 
the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Botswana, at http://www.aaanet.org/committees/cfhr/ 
rptbotswana.htm (1997) (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 27. In May and June 1997, the government resettled 600 CKGR residents of the !Xade 
community within the CKGR, about half of the remaining CKGR population, into the resettlement 
village of New !Xade outside the reserve. See Christian Erni, Resettlement of Khwe Communities 
Continues, 3/4 INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 28–29 (1997). The resettlements of 1997 and 1998 decreased the 
population further. See Hitchcock, supra note 24, at 19. 
 28. See American Anthropological Association, supra note 26.  
 29. See Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies, supra note 24; Erni, supra note 27, at 9. 
Visitors to settlements outside the CKGR observe that they are in poor condition. In 1997 Erni noted 
that “New !Xade is a desolate place with hardly any trees to provide shade and without potable water,” 
and, while a pipeline with brackish water was built, “the people were not provided with any building 
material.” Erni, supra note 27, at 9. The International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs observed 
of the New !Xade and Kaudwane settlements that their “populations . . . are so large, and the resources 
in the vicinity of the settlements so few, that the residents have been unable to sustain themselves 
through foraging, small-scale agro-pastoralism and rural industries,” thus forcing them “to depend 
heavily on the government of Botswana’s relief programs.” INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON 
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, THE INDIGENOUS WORLD: 2000–2001, at 281 (Diane Vinding ed., 2002) 
[hereinafter IWGIA Report]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/4
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In the last several years, problems in the CKGR have worsened. In 
early 2002, the government announced that it was ceasing provision of all 
basic services, including water, food rations, health services, and 
transportation for children to schools.30 Despite criticism from the US 
ambassador and diplomatic representatives of other countries,31 the 
government continued its efforts to empty the CKGR, confiscating 
vechicles and setting up roadblocks to prevent the G//ana and the G/wi 
from returning to the reserve, notwithstanding the claim of a local 
government minister in New !Xade that the San were “free” to return.32 
Allegations surfaced that diamond mining lay behind the resettlement and 
that the government had made concessions in the CKGR.33 In response, 
the government has emphatically denied that the San are being removed to 
facilitate mining, and that regardless the issue is an internal matter.34  
Speculation has been borne out in some measure by the revelation that 
the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation is providing 
 30. Press Release, The Botswana Centre for Human Rights, Ditshwanelo (Jan. 31, 2002), at 
http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  
 31. Ambassador John E. Lange questioned Botswana’s treatment of the San after visiting the 
CKGR and resettlement camps. He “emphasized that the San people must be allowed to choose where 
want to they live,” and that the settlement conditions were “unsustainable.” He also offered US 
assistance to ensure the San’s return to their lands. Richard Howitt, a member of the European 
Parliament’s Development Committee, also visited the CKGR and met with San representatives. US 
Condemns Botswana’s Eviction of “Bushmen”, AFROL NEWS, Aug. 28, 2002, at 
http://www.afrol.com/News2002/bot005_san_us_amb.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004). In addition, MP 
Angus Robertson on May 11, 2004 tabled an Early Day Motion in the UK Parliament recognizing the 
CKGR as the ancestral land of the Gana and Gwi, expressing concern over the government’s eviction 
of the San, and urging the Government to encourage the government of Botswana to strenghthen the 
rights of the San under international law and their right to return to and inhabit the CGHR. The EDM 
garnered 38 votes. See Early Day Motion 1168, available at http://edm.ais.co.uk/weblink/ 
html/motion.html/ref=1168 The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, stated in his 2001/2002 report to 
the Human Rights Commission that “the Bushmen, numbering around 80,000, have been the victims 
of discriminatory practices and their survival as a distinct people is endangered by official 
assimilationist policies. Of particular concern is the fact that many groups have been dispossessed of 
their traditional lands to make way for game reserves and national parks.” Economics and Social 
Council, Indigenous Issues, Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Item 15. U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/97/Add.1 (2002) (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). Such displacement has frequently occurred 
in sub-Saharan Africa. See, e.g., RODERICK P. NEUMANN, IMPOSING WILDERNESS: STRUGGLES OVER 
LIVELIHOOD AND NATURE PRESERVATION IN AFRICA (1998). 
 32. Botswana Remains Harsh on “Bushmen”, AFROL NEWS, Sept. 13, 2002, at 
http://www.afrol.com/News2002/bot006_san_evicted.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 33. The diamond issue has been taken up particularly by the London-based NGO Survival 
International, which has sought to mobilize international opinion and to confront the Botswana 
government as well as the De Beers diamond concern by organizing protests and sit-ins and making 
appeals to boycott tourism, among other strategies. See http://www.survival-international.org (last 
visited June 18, 2004). 
 34. See, e.g., Central Kalahari Game Reserve Carved up for Diamonds, at http://www.survival-
international.org/bushman_030220.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
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funds for diamond prospecting in the Central Kalahari by Kalahari 
Diamonds Ltd. (KDL), a British subsidiary of BHP Billiton, the world’s 
largest “diversified resource group,” whose 2002 revenues were more than 
double Botswana’s total GDP.35 Although the government has provided 
ninety prospecting licenses to KDL covering about 78,000 square 
kilometers, roughly one-third of the licenses lie within the boundaries of 
the Central Kalahari and Khutse Game Reserves.36 The IFC stresses that 
“Botswana’s rapid growth . . . has been based on the exploitation of 
mineral deposits, the reinvestment of the returns . . . in the sustainable 
development of the economy, sensible economic policies and expenditure 
allocations, and a democratic system of Government.”37 Even if this claim 
is, narrowly speaking, true, it reflects a perspective that fails to recognize 
the experience, conditions, and marginalized status of the San, who, 
despite the project’s inclusion of their traditional territory, are not slated to 
receive anything beyond a vague assurance about IFC-backed “local 
economic development” if their lands are mined.38  
The crisis over the Central Kalahari Game Reserve and other aspects of 
the San’s experience in Botswana illustrate how development efforts 
 35. See World Bank Support for Controversial Batswana Diamond Project, Feb. 17, 2003, at 
http://www.afrol.com/prueba/html/News2003/bot002diamond_project.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); 
Bushmen Lose to Diamond Mining, Activists Say, Feb. 18, 2003, at http://www.sadocc.at/news/ 2003-
050.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2004); Diamond Miners Exploit Land of the Bushmen, THE GUARDIAN, 
Feb. 20, 2003. See also International Finance Corporation, Environmental Review Summary, Project 
20426, (2003), at http://www.ifc.org [hereinafter IFC]. The IFC contribution is small in itself but will 
assure the equity investors whom KDL is seeking to attract by raising $12–20 million by private 
placement. BHP Billiton has been the object of criticism for its corporate predecessor BHP’s original 
controlling interest in the Ok Tedi mine in western Papua New Guinea (BHP and Billiton merged in 
2001, after which the interest was divested). In 1982 Ok Tedi was constructed in the rainforest. It 
annually generated millions of tons of waste rock and tailings which, instead of being contained or 
stored, was dumped into the Ok Tedi river. See Global Mining Campaign, Digging Deep: Is Modern 
Mining Sustainable? 10–11, at http://www.jatam.org/wti/doc_lain/digging%20deepEng-edited.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2004). Local communities mobilized, and brought their claims to the 
International Water Tribunal in the Hague, which found that BHP had violated the rights of 
downstream residents. Id. at 11. A lawsuit was also brought in Melbourne, Australia, where BHP was 
incorporated. It was settled in 1996 for an estimated $500 million and commitments to tailings 
containment. Id. Nonetheless, residents brought another lawsuit in 2000 charging BHP with violating 
the terms of the settlement. Id. The IFC documents do not mention the Ok Tedi mine, instead referring 
only to BHP Billiton’s Ekati mine in Canada and the Mozal smelter in Mozambique. IFC, supra note 
35. 
 36. Id. The IFC’s Environmental Review Summary (“ERS”) states that the government “has a 
successful record of using revenues from mining over [the] last two decades to upgrade infrastructure 
and to improve educational and health standards and this provides a sound foundation for its economic 
diversification program.” IFC, supra note 35. The IFC’s ERS, while it acknowledges the possible 
impacts on the CKGR’s environment and the San, asserts that they “can be minimized and mitigated 
with careful management.” Id. See also Bushmen Lose to Diamond Exploration, supra note 35. 
 37. IFC, supra note 35. 
 38. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/4
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cannot be assumed to benefit indigenous groups but rather can coexist 
with, and under certain circumstances, contribute to their continuing 
dispossession and subordination. No single factor is exclusively 
responsible for this dynamic in Botswana, but a key imperative has been 
the refusal to recognize historically-entrenched inequities that track ethnic 
divisions and that are grounded in legal and political institutions. 
Botswana’s history suggests that continued failure to acknowledge such 
inequities will only frustrate the advancement of indigenous rights and a 
more equitable dispersion of the fruits of development.  
III. THE SAN AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY 
Before tracing the creation of San subordination under the legal and 
political frameworks of pre-colonial Tswanadom and, later, the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, it is necessary to convey a better sense of how 
ethnicity, and in particular notions of ethnic identity, have figured in 
relations between the San and the Tswana-dominated government. 
Ethnicity is a category that is often conspicuously absent from discussions 
about human rights and development, but claims about and struggles over 
ethnicity frequently affect the allocation of rights and resources in 
normatively significant ways.39 The troubled relations between the San 
and the government can be best be understood in view of struggles over 
ethnic identity, as different actors have used notions of San identity to 
advance public claims about resources and rights. This pattern has 
recurred from the days of Tswana control over the San, when the San were 
not recognized as having the appropriate social structure for community 
membership, to the present day, when the government ardently seeks to 
assimilate the San into broader society. 
Although the groups constituting the San have recently engaged in 
deliberations about how they collectively wish to be addressed, notably 
few of the popular names have been coined by the San themselves.40 
 39. Development strategies that overlook ethnic animosities may produce disastrous results. See, 
e.g., AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC 
HATRED & GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2002) (discussing a pervasive phenomenon by which economic 
liberalization has exacerbated economic dominance by ethnic minorities, eventually leading to 
nationalist backlash by ethnic majorities). 
 40. As Komtsha Komtsha of the Kuru Development Trust remarked at a 1992 workshop, “By 
which name should the Basarwa be known? Nobody has asked us what our name is and how we 
should be called. All other tribes know who they are, and have a name by which they are known.” See 
SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 175. Historically, however, the San have been described as “Khwe,” 
“Basarwa,” and “Bushmen,” among other names, as well as by the names of the distinct ethnic groups 
that constitute them, including, for example, the Ju/’hoansi [!Kung], G/wi, G//ana, Kxoe, Nharo 
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Traditionally, the San groups in Botswana have been labeled “Basarwa,” a 
Setswana term used by the dominant Tswana tribes.41 Basarwa is derived 
from a word meaning “people of the south,”42 reflecting the perspective of 
northern-originating Tswana tribes. The term “Basarwa,” though viewed 
by some as pejorative, improved on the former term, “Masarwa,” which, 
rather than the “Ba-” prefix used to denote people, contains the “Ma-” 
prefix used to denote objects and animals.43 
Tswana references to the San as “Basarwa,” however, must be 
distinguished from government classifications. The government of 
Botswana occasionally uses “Basarwa” in limited circumstances, but in 
general avoids the explicit use of ethnic classifications, partly on grounds 
that the terms resonate with the legacy of apartheid. To the disapproval of 
the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, the government has even declined to keep official data on 
San populations.44 When the government refers to the San it usually does 
so obliquely in ethnicity-neutral language, often by the expression 
“Remote Area Dweller,” a reference to the government’s Remote Area 
Development Programme (RADP) and the poor, marginalized, rural 
residents who are supported by it. This term not only elides ethnic 
distinctions among the groups participating in the RADP,45 it also defines 
them from the contingent perspective of Tswana groups residing in the 
[Naro], and =Kx’au//’ein. The term “San” was perhaps used earliest by the Khoekhoen or Khoikhoi, a 
traditionally pastoral people inhabiting South Africa’s western Cape, to describe hunters, and means 
“people different from ourselves.” See Alan Barnard, Problems in the Construction of Khoisan 
Ethnicities, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 51, 56. For rough linguistic distribution see 
SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 14. “San” may carry a pejorative connotation in Khoikhoi, and means 
“thief” in Afrikaans, but it gained popularity among researchers, and subsequently has been viewed as 
an acceptable term by San groups. “Khoisan” has been used in reference to hunter-gatherer groups in 
southern Africa who speak click languages. See generally ALAN BARNARD, HUNTERS AND HERDERS 
OF SOUTHERN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE KHOISAN PEOPLES (1992). The term 
“Bushmen” was an anglicized variant of an Afrikaans expression, boschjeman, and was used in 
Namibia until 1996 (when “San” was substituted officially) and in South Africa (where “San” has also 
been used officially). Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Angola do not have official terms for San, but in 
Zimbabwe the names Amasili and Batwa are sometimes used, while in Angola, Kwankhala, Bushmen, 
and Bosquimanos (Portuguese) are used. See generally Robert K. Hitchcock & Megan Biesele, San, 
Khwe, Basarwa, or Bushmen? Terminology, Identity, and Empowerment in Southern Africa, at 
http://www.kalaharipeoples.org/documents/San-term.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). 
 41. See Hitchcock, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 303. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. This did not prevent the World Bank from uncritically using “Masarwa” in a 1985 report. 
See Dov Chernichovsky, Robert E.B. Lucas, & Eva Mueller (World Bank), The Household Economy 
of Rural Botswana: An African Case 3 (1985), available at http://www.worldbank.org (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2004). 
 44. See discussion infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 45. Saugestad estimates that about 70–80% of Remote Area Dwellers are San. SAUGESTAD, 
supra note 21, at 127. 
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urbanized and more densely populated southeastern region of Botswana. 
Above all, the term “Remote Area Dweller” is, as Saugestad observes, 
“deeply resented by those who are so called.”46  
With increasing mobilization around concerns common to the 
numerous groups composing the San, the latter have asserted their 
collective identity in various ways that are gaining momentum. 
Representatives of San groups met in 1996 in Namibia and agreed to allow 
the use of the “San” designation, a decision that was reaffirmed at a 
meeting on “Khoisan Identities and Cultural Heritage” in Cape Town in 
July 1997.47 Other expressions such as “First People” have received 
support among San groups, signifying their status as the first inhabitants of 
the Kalahari desert.48 Finally, the term “Khwe,” meaning “people” in 
Central Bush languages,49 is gaining popularity among the San in 
Botswana, and a variant of it is also used by First People of the Kalahari.50 
Choice of terminology is fraught with risk where groups like the San are 
undergoing a public process of self-definition after years of enduring 
externally imposed classifications. Controversy will likely continue until 
the groups constituting the San reach a consensus on a collective public 
identity. This Article will primarily use the term “San” because it has been 
accepted by groups such as the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities 
in Southern Africa (WIMSA), the Kuru Development Trust, and others.51  
The San are the second largest former forager group in Africa, and an 
estimated 95,000 San inhabit Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.52 The San, contrary to mistaken anthropological 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14. Importantly, the San also emphasized that 
specific group names should continue to be employed for the various social units. Id. 
 48. For example, the organization Kgeikani Kweni (First People of the Kalahari) was formed in 
1992 and has taken a leading role in San advocacy efforts.  
 49. Hitchcock, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 303. See generally Hitchcock, San, 
Khwe, Basarwa, or Bushmen?, supra note 40. 
 50. Hitchcock, San, Khwe, Basawaran Bushmen?, supra note 40. As Roy Sesana, a G//ana 
member and FPK leader from the Central Kalahari, stated in 1992, “we want to be called by our own 
name. The name of ‘Motswana’ [“citizen of Botswana”] makes it impossible for us to receive 
whatever assistance is available, because it comes to a Motswana even if it may be meant for Basarwa. 
We want to be called by our name ‘N/oakwe’ [“Red People”].” See SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 176. 
 51. See, e.g., Working Group for Indigenous Minorities of Southern Africa, 
http://www.san.org.za (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). San communities do not reside exclusively in 
Botswana, and it should be noted that, while some issues for San groups in Botswana are common to 
San populations in Namibia, South Africa, and elsewhere, references to the San in this Article should 
generally be interpreted as references to the San in Botswana. 
 52. Robert K. Hitchcock & John D. Holm, Bureaucratic Domination of Hunter-Gatherer 
Societies: A Study of the San in Botswana, 24 DEV. & CHANGE 305, 307 (1993). I use the term 
“former” because the San used to be a foraging group but with Botswana’s development have in many 
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claims made in the past, are emphatically not a “dying race.”53 Botswana 
has the largest concentration of San groups with an estimated population 
of 45–60,000, constituting about four percent of the national population.54 
The San have inhabited what is now Botswana and contiguous areas for 
millennia, perhaps as long as 30,000–40,000 years. San paintings in 
southern Africa have been dated between 19,000 and 27,000 years old.55 
To many, the San are best known as a hunter-gatherer and forager group, 
and this is often how they have been characterized by anthropologists, the 
media, and government officials.56  
One’s intuition might be that the hunting, gathering, and foraging 
practices of San groups is important to recognizing their “real” or 
“traditional” identity rather than one imposed or articulated by the 
government. It turns out, however, that the notion that the San are hunter-
gatherer “nomads” has been used by Botswana’s government as a reason 
not to allocate land to the San, to build schools and clinics, or to provide 
other social services.57 As WIMSA declared at a 1997 conference, “the 
stereotypes of nomadism have been used to justify the exclusion of the 
San from their rights to land, natural resources, and development.”58 A 
notorious example is a 1978 legal opinion from the government that 
contended that the “nomadic” status of the San entails that, with the 
exception of hunting rights, they have “no rights of any kind” deriving 
from customary practices, and in particular no land rights.59 
Contrary to the “nomadic” stereotype, there is evidence indicating 
well-developed practices among San groups for recognizing and 
respecting defined territorial boundaries that mark one group’s usage 
capacities taken on a non-foraging lifestyle. The reality of the situation, however, is likely more 
complex than terms such as “foraging” or “hunting-gathering” can convey, and I do not intend to make 
any definitive anthropological claims in this regard. 
 53. See discussion and debunking of this misconception in Phillip Tobias, Myths and 
Misunderstanding About Khoisan Identities and Status, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 19. 
 54. See Good, supra note 12, at 206; Hitchcock & Holm, supra note 44; HITCHCOCK, supra note 
14, at 13; IWGIA Report, supra note 29, at 277. The relatively wide range likely derives in part from 
the government’s refusal to keep official statistics on San populations in Botswana.  
 55. J.D. LEWIS-WILLIAMS, DISCOVERING SOUTHERN AFRICAN ROCK ART 17–18 (Cape Town 
1990). See Good, supra note 12, at 206. 
 56. See, e.g., John Simpson, Botswana Bushman Fights for Survival, BBC NEWS WORLD 
EDITION (Aug. 15, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/219564.stm (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2004).  
 57. Ngakaeaja, Mathambo et al., A San Position: Research, the San and San Organizations, in 
KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 30.  
 58. Id. 
 59. In this regard, there is some evidence to support the claim that the “ideological foundation” 
of San subordination rests “in the myth, or more precisely the manufactured tradition, of San 
aboriginality and hence of their propertylessness.” Good, supra note 12, at 210. 
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rights over land, game, water, and other resources.60 In addition, evidence 
exists to support the claim that, contrary to past assumptions, the San at 
various points engaged in agropastoralist activities beyond hunting and 
gathering.61 Anthropological debate about the past practices of the San will 
continue, but regardless of its outcome, it is clear that the San currently do 
not engage exclusively in a “nomadic” hunter-gatherer lifestyle.62 At the 
same time, some San continue to hunt, gather, and forage.63 Perhaps the 
best view is that the San engage in “clusters of adaptive strategies that 
combine hunting and gathering with products from agriculture and 
pastoralism on a seasonal or occasional basis, or mixed strategies where 
agriculture and pastoralism provide the majority if not all of 
subsistence.”64 For our purposes, it may be said that it is simplistic, and 
 60. See, e.g., BARNARD, supra note 40, at 147; Richard Lee, !Kung Spatial Organization: An 
Ecological and Historical Perspective, 1 HUMAN ECOLOGY 125 (1972), reprinted in KALAHARI 
HUNTER-GATHERERS: STUDIES OF THE !KUNG SAN AND THEIR NEIGHBORS 122–26 (R. Lee. & I. de 
Vore, eds., 1976); SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 88–90; GEORGE SILBERBAUER, HUNTER AND 
HABITAT IN THE CENTRAL KALAHARI DESERT 192–94 (1981). See also Kristyna Bishop, Squatters on 
Their Own Land: San Territoriality in Western Botswana, 31 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 92 (1997). 
An early anthropological study noted that “each group of [San] has a very specific territory which that 
group alone may use, and they respect the boundaries rigidly. Each group also knows the territory very 
well . . . and [has] usually named every place in it where a certain kind of veld food may grow.” 
ELIZABETH MARSHALL THOMAS, THE HARMLESS PEOPLE 10 (1959).  
 61. Some contend that the San were the first pastoralists in Botswana and that they owned 
significant cattle and sheep herds. Tobias finds it likely that “the San of today have not always been 
hunters, and that there have been phases of herding over the last 2,000 years, whilst, under conditions 
of adversity, some groups lost their cattle and reverted to hunting.” Tobias, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, 
supra note 53, at 26. Wilmsen further posits that San groups were significantly involved in regional 
trading networks for ceramics and ivory. EDWIN WILMSEN, LAND FILLED WITH FLIES: A POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE KALAHARI 11 (1989). 
 62. See Hitchcock & Holm, supra note 52, at 310. Hitchcock notes that “[w]hatever the relative 
proportions of foraging and domestic production in the past,” in the last several decades the San have 
moved significantly “away from foraging to domestic food production and wage earning.” Id. In 
addition, a large proportion of San in the late twentieth century became dependent on government 
transfers and work programs. Id. at 310–11. Taylor asserts that, as of 1997, only about 5% of San in 
Botswana had sufficient resource access for hunting and gathering to be a viable subsistence practice, 
and that 80–90% depend primarily on government assistance. Michael Taylor, These Are Our Hills, in 
KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 352. This phenomenon has taken hold in the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve, among other places—“whereas the people of the [CKGR] region were mobile foragers 
in the 1960s, in the 1990s, the vast majority of the people living in the reserve depended on domestic 
foods obtained through drought relief, national feeding programs, or by purchasing it.” Hitchcock, 
supra note 25.  
 63. For example, a 1989 study of five San communities found a plurality of lifestyles, ranging 
from hunting and gathering in one, to labor and squatting on cattle ranches in another, to agriculture 
and craftwork in others. Megan Biesele et al., Hunters, Clients and Squatters: The Contemporary 
Socioeconomic Status of Botswana Basarwa, 9 AFRICAN STUDY MONOGRAPHS 109 (1989), available 
at http://jambo.africa.kyoto u.ac.jp/kiroku/asm_normal/root.htm-  (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).  
 64. See SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 94; Helga I.D. Vierich, Adaptive Flexibility in a Multi-
Ethnic Setting: The Basarwa of the Southern Kalahari, in POLITICS AND HISTORY IN BAND SOCIETIES 
213–22 (E. Leacock & R. Lee eds., 1982). 
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probably misleading, to generalize about San groups as exclusively being 
hunter-gatherers or sedentary agriculturalists, as differences exist within 
and among the various San groups in Botswana, and different activities 
have, in many instances, likely been pursued across time by the same 
group. Having examined some of the key questions of ethnic identity and 
their impact on the rights and resources enjoyed by the San in Botswana, 
we may now turn to an historical analysis of how legal and political 
institutions, both customary and formal, strengthened inequities along 
ethnic divisions, leading to dispossession and subordination that have 
never been rectified.  
IV. THE SAN ENCOUNTER WITH THE TSWANA: SERFDOM AND POLITICAL 
EXCLUSION IN THE PRE-COLONIAL ERA 
Sometimes the problems of indigenous peoples are viewed in terms 
that emphasize the influence or legacy of historical, colonial domination 
by external powers based in the West or North, whether through direct 
oppression or indirectly via the entrenchment of a domestic elite that 
oppressed the indigenous group. It is well-known that many indigenous 
groups were historically subjected to enslavement, dispossession, and 
extinguishment in numerous regions of the world. San and Khoikhoi 
groups in South Africa suffered such treatment at the hands of early 
European settlers.65 It would be a serious error, however, to view the 
current problems in Botswana without reference to Botswana’s pre-
colonial politics. A central claim of this Article is that the problems 
confronted by the San in Botswana today in many respects derive from, 
and resonate with, their relationship with the dominant Tswana tribes and 
the latter’s customary legal and political structures. During the era of pre-
colonial Tswana dominance the San were subjected to serfdom and 
political exclusion, creating a legacy of subordination and setting the 
groundwork for contemporary injustices in the areas of economic relations 
and land, hunting, and cultural rights. 
Regular contact has existed between the San and the Bantu-speaking, 
agro-pastoral Tswana peoples for an estimated 2000 years.66 Perhaps as 
 65. See, e.g., DAVID ABERNETHY, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE: EUROPEAN 
OVERSEAS EMPIRES, 1415–1980 56–57 (2001). 
 66. WILMSEN, supra note 61. It should be noted, however, that there is significant controversy 
among anthropologists over the extent and history of contacts between the San and non-hunter 
gatherer peoples like the Tswana. Wilmsen, for example, charges some anthropologists with 
encouraging an inaccurate and ahistorical depiction of the San that overly focuses on ecological 
determinants of their lifestyle instead of social and cultural contacts with other groups, presenting a 
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early as 700–800 years ago, Tswana tribes began migrating into present 
day Botswana from the north and east, crossing the Zambezi River from 
Zambia or Zimbabwe,67 although their presence until about 200 years ago 
was largely limited to a relatively small area near the present day borders 
of the three countries.68 Those who crossed the Zambezi broke up into a 
number of different tribes, each with its own territory and capital,69 and 
several Tswana kingdoms emerged between the seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries.70 Conflicts with white settlers and other factors 
brought larger numbers of Tswana and other Bantu-speaking groups into 
Botswana during the nineteenth century.71 By the early twentieth century, 
the eight most powerful Tswana tribes controlled most of Botswana, with 
the exception of the Chobe, Ghanzi, and Kgalagadi districts in the west, 
which consisted of Crown lands with significant San populations.72  
Although it appears that initially Tswana and San groups engaged in 
more or less equitable trade and hunting arrangements, matters changed 
with the nineteenth-century growth of the cattle economy, during which 
Tswana cattle herders transformed some San lands into cattle posts and 
subjugated the San to exploit their labor.73 Many of the San and members 
of other minority groups became serfs (malata), occupying the bottom of a 
tiered structure including, in descending status, the Tswana chief (kgosi)74 
and his relatives (dikgosana), commoners (batlhanka), and foreigners 
(bafaladi).75 San living among the Ngwato and Tawana tribes had duties 
including hunting, cattle herding, and plowing, and had to pay tribute from 
romanticized, Neolithic picture of “ancient” humanity. Id. 
 67. See SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 57–61. 
 68. Id. at 96. 
 69. Bishop, supra note 60, at 93. The tribes included the Tawana, Ngwato, Kwena, Ngwaketse, 
Lete, Kgatla, Rolong, Tlakwa and Tlhaping. 
 70. Hitchcock & Holm, supra note 52, at 308. 
 71. SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 96. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See WILMSEN, supra note 61, at 282–89. 
 74. See discussion infra note 85. 
 75. K. Datta & A. Murray, The Rights of Minorities and Subject Peoples in Botswana: A 
Historical Evaluation 58, 58–59, in DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA (John Holm & Patrick Molutsi eds., 
1989); ISAAC SCHAPERA, NATIVE LAND TENURE IN THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 26–27 
(1943). Whether a group of foreigners became commoners or descended to serfdom depended on 
factors such as whether they had been absorbed by conquest. Additional factors include whether they 
had a strong corporate identity, a tradition of centralized leadership, and a culture that melded easily 
with Tswana culture. The San, having been conquered by Tswana and having decentralized leadership, 
a highly distinct culture from that of the Tswana, and a relatively weak corporate identity, were 
relegated to serfdom. Datta & Murray, supra at 67. A similar fate befell the Bakalagadi, traditional 
Kalahari inhabitants who have been removed from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. 
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the gains of their hunting forays.76 Serfs could not transfer their allegiance 
to other persons, and serfdom was passed down through the generations.77 
The San were not considered members of the relevant Tswana political 
community for definition of rights, namely, the morafe (nation or 
kingdom). Membership in the morafe was defined by membership in a 
ward, the basic administrative unit in Tswanadom and the primary vehicle, 
other than inheritance, for transfer of residential and arable land.78 
Through the ward system, the kgosi first distributed land to the ward 
heads, the official representatives, and spokesmen of ward members,79 
who then would distribute land to individual households based on their 
perceived needs.80 The receiver of the land then held exclusive usage 
rights over the land while the community remained the owner; the 
individual interest was nonetheless secure as the tribe held a reversionary 
interest if the land became vacant.81 Non-membership in the ward system 
denied the San access to the primary means of land distribution for 
residential and arable lands under Tswana custom. Grazing land rights 
were not distributed through the ward system, and instead were treated as 
communal rather than individual. Nonetheless, the right to use grazing 
areas depended upon being a member of the tribal community.82 As 
Frimpong explains, 
[A] tribesman’s right to occupy and use land in the tribal area was 
based on his tribal affinity; it was a right conferred by virtue of his 
membership of the tribe. While he remained a member of the tribe 
he was entitled to a piece of land for residential purposes, [and] a 
piece for arable purposes, and enjoyed a right to graze his cattle on 
the communal grazing land.83 
The San were denied these rights, however, as they lacked the requisite 
tribal recognition by the Tswana.  
 76. See SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 99–100. 
 77. Id. at 100. 
 78. In this part I use the past tense insofar as this structure probably had the greatest importance 
before the emergence of Botswana, but much of this tribal structure continues today.  
 79. SCHAPERA, supra note 75, at 29. 
 80. Kwame Frimpong, Post-Independence Land Legislation and the Process of Land Tenure 
Reform in Botswana, 26 COMP. & INT’L J. S. AFR. 385, 387 (1993). See also SCHAPERA, supra note 
67, at 44–45. 
 81. Frimpong, supra note 80, at 387. “Those who were not ward members, for example most if 
not all [San], were treated as serfs, as persons without rights.” Datta & Murray, supra note 75, at 60. 
 82. Frimpong, supra note 80, at 387. 
 83. Id. 
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The marginalization of the San within the Tswana chiefdoms was not 
limited to land distribution or economic issues. The San were “more than 
just an economic and social underclass” but “were excluded from 
participation in Tswana political life.”84 As serfs, the San were excluded 
from participation in the ward kgotla, the traditional Tswana deliberative 
forum for the promulgation of laws, the adjudication of civil and criminal 
disputes, and discussion of matters of general tribal concern.85 Each kgotla 
was headed by the kgosi, selected by primogeniture, who had the final 
decision in all matters, and the power to allocate land.86 Moreover, 
although the kgosi could receive information and opinions from whomever 
he wished, his inner council was typically constituted by relatives. 
Exclusion from dikgotla meant that the San depended on Tswana masters 
and were unable to build up significant herds or gain access to land and 
water.87 Some subject groups could take advantage of economic mobility 
provided by participation in the mafisa, a form of cattle-lending on which 
an individual, in return for herding a patron’s cattle, could receive one or 
more offspring per year, but the San were denied this privilege.88 The 
period of precolonial Tswana rule brought not only serfdom and political 
exclusion, but also the commencement of a trend toward external control 
and regulation of the San hunting practices.89 Although serfdom eventually 
 84. Hitchcock & Holm, supra note 52, at 310. 
 85. Datta & Murray, supra note 75, at 64 (“Those of the lowest status, the Basarwa, were 
excluded from the kgotla system altogether”). For further discussion of the kgotla, see P.T. Mgadla & 
A.C. Campbell, Dikgotla, Dikgosi and the Protectorate Administration, in DEMOCRACY IN 
BOTSWANA, supra note 75, at 48–57; and L.D. Ngcongco, Tswana Political Tradition: How 
Democratic?, in DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA, supra note 75, at 42, 45. On exclusion of serfs, see Datta 
& Murray, supra note 75, at 66.  
 86. Mgadla & Campbell, supra note 85, at 49. Discussion here will use the past tense since the 
focus is on the pre-colonial era, but it should be noted that the kgotla continues today, although some 
of its powers have been superseded by formal institutions. 
 87. Datta & Murray, supra note 75, at 63. 
 88. Id. at 60–61. 
 89. During the nineteenth century, Tswana chiefs imposed numerous regulations and restrictions 
on hunting. They classified a variety of animals such as elephants, giraffes, eland, and ostrich to be 
“royal game” and therefore off limits to San hunters. See CLIVE SPINAGE, HISTORY AND EVOLUTION 
OF THE FAUNA CONSERVATION LAWS OF BOTSWANA 8–11 (1990). Wild animals in Tswana tribal 
lands were held in trust for the tribe controlling the area by its chief, and therefore a hunter usually 
could not freely dispose of game killed in such areas but had to provide all or some of it to the chief. 
The San and other subject groups had to provide chiefs and other high-status individuals with tribute in 
the form of meat and skins. They also served as guides for the chiefs’ hunting trip. Id. Although the 
practice of tribute was largely ended by the end of the 1930s, resulting in a brief increase of hunting 
freedom for the San and other groups, new tribal restrictions were soon imposed on the hunting of 
large game at the request of the British. These restrictions were partly in response to the devastating 
effects on wildlife from the European-driven game trade. Id. at 9. 
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ended, its legacies lived on in the form of low wage labor, exclusion from 
the kgotla, and lack of recognition of San land and resource rights.  
V. THE SAN IN THE BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE, 1885–1966 
Although some elements of San subordination during the pre-colonial 
era, such as serfdom, were alleviated or terminated with Britain’s arrival, 
many were not. Moreover, in some respects British rule ratified previously 
customary inequitable relations. Britain’s acquisition of control over the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate involved the use of legal methods that 
purported to empower Britain to make sweeping claims of sovereignty, 
jurisdiction, and, eventually, title over lands previously controlled by the 
San. An administrative framework was established that accorded the most 
powerful Tswana tribes substantial autonomy with respect to their lands, 
but that denied San groups any formal recognition, instead forcing them to 
live within areas controlled by the Tswana tribes or in Protectorate-
administered Crown lands. British creation of Tswana tribal reserves, 
whatever its benefits for the Tswana, enabled the continued exclusion of 
the San from the institutions of the ward, morafe, and kgotla. Britain also 
imposed a European model of wildlife and land conservation, subjecting 
San groups to a series of increasingly burdensome regulations that rarely 
respected the subsistence and cultural functions of San hunting. The 
CKGR, which carved out of the Crown lands in 1961, provided some 
measure of security for San inhabitants. Its protections were modest and 
far weaker than they might have been, however, easing the future 
expulsion of the San in the late 1990s.  
A. The Establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Although Britain eventually took control of Botswana, it was not the 
first European power to colonize southern Africa. What is now the nation 
of South Africa was settled much earlier by the Dutch, as well as French 
Huguenot immigrants, whose descendants, the Boers, spread east and 
north during the eighteenth century seeking land for farming and grazing. 
Boer settlers exterminated or enslaved many Khoikhoi and San in southern 
Africa, but as they moved farther toward the interior, they encountered 
southern-migrating Bantu groups, including Tswana tribes, who possessed 
the size and resistance to European diseases to contest further 
encroachments.90 Competition for land between Tswana and Boer settlers 
 90. See ABERNETHY, supra note 65, at 56–57. 
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eventually produced violent conflict between the two groups. In the late 
nineteenth century Tswana tribes, seeking to end the violence, appealed to 
Britain for protection,91 eventually overcoming early British reluctance.92 
Although diamonds, gold, and farmland attracted settlers to the coast of 
the Cape Colony in South Africa,93 Britain evidently did not have a strong 
interest in Botswana’s resources at that time. Britain did wish, however, to 
prevent German expansion from the latter’s colony of Southwest Africa 
(now Namibia).94 The so-called “scramble for Africa”95 commenced in the 
late nineteenth century and ran through 1913, a period that saw relatively 
little armed conflict between the European powers and a huge expansion 
of their colonial holdings.96 That a territory was viewed as unsuitable for 
large-scale European settlement posed no barrier to its incorporation into 
an overseas empire, even if only to thereby exclude competitors. For this 
purpose, the legal form of the Protectorate proved invaluable. 
Britain’s presence in Botswana formally commenced with the 
conclusion of treaties between Britain and the chiefs of two Tswana tribes, 
the Baralong and the Batlaping, in May 1884.97 On January 27, 1885 
Britain founded the Bechuanaland Protectorate.98 The January Order in 
Council delimited an area that covered only perhaps half of what is now 
Botswana and included northern parts of what is now South Africa.99 The 
Order set forth the contents of the treaties with the 1884 treaties, and 
pronounced jurisdiction over all British subjects, all those enjoying 
Britain’s protection within the territory described by the Order, and all 
persons within the limits of the Baralong and Batlaping lands specified in 
 91. See Bishop, supra note 60, at 93, 104. 
 92. Id. at 103–04. 
 93. ABERNETHY, supra note 65, at 93. 
 94. Britain declared a protectorate to prevent a junction between Southwest Africa and the South 
African Republic (Transvaal), with whom Britain was on hostile terms, culminating in the Boer War of 
1899–1902. See JOHN ILIFFE, AFRICANS: THE HISTORY OF A CONTINENT 191 (1995). 
 95. See id. at 187–211. The partitioning of Africa among the European powers accelerated after 
the Berlin conference of 1884–85, where it was decided that Britain’s informal exercise of influence 
through naval and commercial power would not be recognized as a valid claim to territory. Id. at 189. 
 96. During this time Europe held claim to some 8.6 million square miles of land, totaling 
approximately one-sixth of the world’s land surface. See ABERNETHY, supra note 65, at 81, 88–93. 
 97. M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 36–37 (1925).  
 98. See Bechuanaland Protectorate Order in Council of 27 January 1885; LINDLEY, supra note 
97, at 37. 
 99. The Protectorate’s northern boundary cut across the Kalahari Desert at 22 degrees south (i.e. 
south of Botswana’s current northern border, and cutting through what is now the Ghanzi district) with 
a western boundary of 20 degrees east, and had a southern boundary abutting the Cape of Good Hope 
Colony, and an eastern boundary abutting the South African Republic.  
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the treaties.100 Notably, therefore, the Order implied that in tribal areas 
other than those of the Baralong and Batlaping, Britain did not have 
jurisdiction over non-British subjects or those not under British protection. 
A subsequent 1885 Proclamation subdivided the area delimited in the 
January Order (described as previously “not within the jurisdiction of any 
civilised power”) into two parcels largely along the Molopo River, which 
serves as part of the Republic of Botswana’s current southern boundary.101 
The area south and east of the Molopo and bounded by the Cape of Good 
Hope Colony and the South African Republic became the territory of 
British Bechuanaland (later allocated to the Cape Colony and subsequently 
to South Africa), a British colony over which “Her Majesty’s Sovereignty” 
was proclaimed.102 The area north and west of the Molopo remained 
Bechuanaland Protectorate,103 whose internal sovereignty, with the 
exception of cessions by the two Tswana tribes mentioned above, 
remained intact.104 The Protectorate’s borders were greatly expanded by an 
1891 Order in Council,105 which moved its boundaries to the Zambezi and 
Chobe Rivers in the north and east (covering thousands of square 
kilometers). This set of boundaries largely remained stable, with some 
modifications,106 through transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of 
Botswana in 1966.107 The expansion of boundaries covered the Ngamiland 
district and the northern half of the Ghanzi district, both areas with major 
San populations.  
Little effort was made to explain how Britain acquired external 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The 1891 order contained only the general 
prefatory clauses “whereas the territories . . . are under the protection of 
Her Majesty” and “whereas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, and other 
lawful means Her Majesty has power and jurisdiction in the said 
territories.”108 Given that only two treaties encompassing a relatively small 
 100. LINDLEY, supra note 97, at 37. 
 101. BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE NO. 1 (Sept. 30, 1885). 
 102. See LINDLEY, supra note 97, at 187. 
 103. See BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE NO. 1, supra note 101. 
 104. Its external sovereignty was ceded to Britain by the initial 27 January 1885 Order. 
 105. Order in Council (May 1, 1891), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE ORDERS IN COUNCIL 
AND HIGH COMMISSIONER’S PROCLAMATIONS 1891–1914 1–4 (M. Williams ed., 1915) [hereinafter 
BECHAUNLAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914].  
 106. See, e.g., Proc No. 8 of 28 March 1899, in BECHAUNLAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, 
supra note 105, at 114 (modifying eastern boundary slightly).  
 107. See Bishop, supra note 60, at 105. 
 108. See BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105. The language of “treaty, 
grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means” essentially derives from the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 
originally passed in 1843 and subsequently modified. See Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843, 6&7 Vict c. 
94 (Eng.). The Act empowered the Crown to gain extraterritorial jurisdiction over a foreign territory 
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area were concluded, it seems highly improbable that such vague 
references would have justified the acquisition of sovereignty over lands 
encompassing tens of thousands of square kilometers inhabited by a 
number of different groups.109 Whether or not a justification existed, such 
methods of extending empire were generally treated by colonial powers as 
acceptable, particularly after the agreements made at the Berlin conference 
of 1885.110 European powers regularly buttressed weak territorial claims 
by reference to claims of discovery, papal bulls, conclusion of treaties with 
chiefs or rival states, settlements, and conquest.111 Although the legal 
adequacy of these methods, as McNeil observes, “is a matter of debate,” 
this was of no consequence, as “[i]n practical terms, might made right, so 
that a sovereign who succeeded in exercising a sufficient degree of 
exclusive control was generally regarded as having acquired 
sovereignty.”112 
Even by the terms of its legislation, however, Britain had not yet 
gained internal sovereignty or jurisdiction over all individuals in the 
Protectorate. The reason relates to the distinction in international law 
between colonies and protectorates. Jurisdiction in British colonies was 
unlimited, whereas jurisdiction in protectorates was limited to territory 
acquired through “treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance and other 
lawful means”113 (in essence, the same language used in the legislation of 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate114). Declaring a protectorate, as Pain 
explains, “did not involve the assumption of any jurisdiction over the 
by such methods, which notably included others besides concluding treaties. In this way “[t]he Acts 
empowered English courts to recognise the less formal acquisition of an imperium in uncivilised 
territory than in civilised countries.” See P.G. McHugh, The Aboriginal Rights of the New Zealand 
Maori at Common Law 51 (unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, Cambridge University) (on file with 
author) (McHugh translates imperium as “right of government”). McHugh helpfully discusses the 
development of the concept of civilization in international law and its wide use in the late nineteenth 
century. Id. at 50. 
 109. In terms of domestic law, however, the apparent weakness of justification was irrelevant. 
Under English law, the determination of the adequacy by which the Crown acquired territory lay with 
the Crown, as part of royal prerogative, and no municipal court could challenge a declaration of 
sovereignty. KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 111 (1989). See also Post Office v. 
Estuary Radio, 2 Q.B. 740, 753 (1968); R. v. Kent Justices, 1 All E.R. 560 (1967).  
 110. See McNeil, supra note 109, at 98. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Nyali v. Attorney-General, 2 W.L.R. 649 (1955). See also T. OLAWALE ELIAS, BRITISH 
COLONIAL LAW 38 (1962) (quoting Nyali v. Attorney-General); MCHUGH, supra note 108, at 52 (“so 
far as the acquisition of an extraterritorial jurisdiction in African territory was concerned, the Crown’s 
advisors proceeded on the basis that jurisdiction over British subjects and the native inhabitants could 
be derived from treaty, grant, usage or sufferance of the native rules”).  
 114. See, e.g., supra note 105. 
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indigenous inhabitants or responsibility for the internal administration of 
the territory by the local rulers,”115 because the protected state, in the 
classical view, sacrificed external sovereignty only.116 The classical view 
also held that the protecting state lacked complete sovereignty over the 
protected state unless the latter ceded such sovereignty.117 
Britain had little early interest in administering Bechuanaland, and 
initially did not seek internal sovereignty over it. The first Assistant 
Commissioner was directed “not to interfere with the Native 
Administration; the Chiefs are understood not to be desirous of parting 
with their rights of sovereignty, nor are Her Majesty’s Government by any 
means anxious to assume the responsibilities of it.”118 Thus, Tshosa 
concludes, “Britain assumed full and complete control over external affairs 
of Bechuanaland Protectorate while internal matters were left to the 
government of the territory.”119 This state of affairs held for a time, but 
changes arrived with the twentieth century and the Rex v. Crewe, ex parte 
Sekgome decision, which in effect rejected the distinction between 
colonies and protectorates based on internal sovereignty. 
The May 1891 Order that greatly expanded the boundaries of the 
Protectorate opened the first cracks in the foregoing doctrinal division 
between colonies and protectorates by providing for, or at least assuming, 
 115. J.H. Pain, The Reception of English and Roman-Dutch Law in Africa with Reference to 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 11 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 137, 143 (1978). 
 116. As Westlake explained, with protectorates “it is arranged that the [protected state] shall enter 
into no treaty or have any diplomatic intercourse with outside states without the consent of the 
[protector] . . . and any contrary attempt at such treaty or intercourse is regarded by the protecting state 
as a hostile act against it on the part of the outside state concerned as well as on the part of the 
protected state.” JOHN WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, PART I: PEACE 22 (1904). 
 117. In Vattel’s terms, 
Consequently a weak state, which, in order to provide for its safety, places itself under the 
protection of a more powerful one, and engages, in return, to perform several offices 
equivalent to that protection, without however divesting itself of the right of government and 
sovereignty,—that state, I say, does not, on this account, cease to rank among the sovereigns 
who acknowledge no other law than that of nations. 
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 2 (Josephe Chilty trans., 1866) (1758). Compare also the 
view of Lord Justice Kennedy in R v. Earl of Crewe Ex parte Sekgome: 
What the idea of a Protectorate excludes, and the idea of annexation on the other hand would 
include is that absolute ownership which was signified by the word ‘dominium’ in Roman 
Law, and which, though perhaps not quite satisfactorily, is sometimes described as territorial 
sovereignty. The protected country remains in regard to the protecting state a foreign country; 
and, this being so, the inhabitants of a Protectorate, whether native born or immigrant settlers, 
do not by virtue of the relationship between the protecting and the protected State become 
subjects of the protecting State. 
R v. Earl of Crewe (ex parte Sekgome), 2 K.B. 577, 620 (1910). 
 118. See SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 11. 
 119. ONKEMETSE TSHOSA, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES OF 
BOTSWANA, NAMIBIA, AND ZIMBABWE 39 (2001). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss3/4
p799 Olmsted.doc  8/5/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA 821 
 
 
 
 
 
 
some measure of internal British sovereignty over the territory. The order 
gave the High Commissioner of South Africa a broad series of powers 
over the Bechuanaland Protectorate, including the appointment of officers 
and legislation by proclamation for justice administration, revenue-
creation, “and generally for the peace, order and good government of all 
persons within the limits of this Order . . . .”120 The Order also specified 
that the High Commissioner, except insofar as incompatible with “due 
exercise” of British power and jurisdiction, “shall respect any native laws 
or customs by which the civil relations of any native chiefs, tribes, or 
populations under [British] protection are now regulated.”121 This 
provision began a long pattern in British governance of according Tswana 
tribes, but not San groups, substantial autonomy in their internal affairs, a 
pattern that largely continued until the transfer of sovereignty to the 
Republic of Botswana.  
In contrast to earlier legislation, which was predicated exclusively on 
Britain’s possession of external sovereignty, the May 1891 Order and a 
Proclamation of June 10, 1891122 gave the South African High 
Commissioner limited jurisdiction and Britain some measure of internal 
sovereignty over the affairs of Bechuanaland Protectorate.123 Importantly, 
the 1891 Proclamation also declared that the laws of the Cape Colony, 
mutatis mutandis, would be those of the Protectorate (though this was 
modified in some respect by 1909 legislation, which limited it to common 
law).124 This declaration could bear significantly on San claims to 
 120. See BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, at 2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Proc (June 10, 1891), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, at 
31–32. The June proclamation further provided for means of government of the Protectorate enabling 
the South African High Commissioner to appoint a Resident Commissioner for Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. This Commissioner was empowered to establish courts, the latter whose jurisdiction did 
not extend in matters “in which natives only are concerned.” Id. The June proclamation also allowed 
the Resident Commissioner to allow Chiefs to adjudicate disputes not involving “any person of 
European birth or descent” as a party, and with regard to land, provided that concessions or grants 
made by Chiefs would not be recognized as binding without sanction of the Secretary of State, and that 
no claims to land by persons of European descent would be recognized without the High 
Commissioner’s approval. Id. at 32.  
 123. See also TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 39–40, observing that “the absence of a government 
with effective control over Bechuanaland Protectorate at the material time and desire to incorporate the 
territory into the Union of South Africa prevailed over the United Kingdom Government to assume 
complete control of both external and internal affairs of Bechuanaland Protectorate,” a policy followed 
in the other protected territories. The 1891 legislation was part of this effort. 
 124. See Proc No. 36 (Dec. 22, 1909), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 
105, at 226. Stating that  
the laws in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on the 10th day of June, 1891 shall 
mutatis mutandis and so far as not inapplicable be the laws in force and to be observed in the 
said Protectorate, but no Statute of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, promulgated after 
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aboriginal title because it was not specifically abrogated by future 
legislation, and some have argued that the “Roman-Dutch common law” 
of the Cape Colony is still the common law of Botswana.125 If this can be 
sustained, it could be an avenue, via the common law, for the use of 
aboriginal title as a common law doctrine in Botswana. Most pertinent to 
the current discussion, however, is the land framework created by Britain 
during the Protectorate era.  
B. The Protectorate Land Framework 
Thus far, the focus has been on the means by which Britain gained 
external sovereignty and some measure of internal sovereignty over the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, and how it created a framework for its 
governance. Most important, however, is the consequence this had for land 
rights in the Protectorate and the acquisition of title over San territories.  
At first, it would seem that merely creating a protectorate would not 
have vested Britain with the power to annex land. As a matter of 
international law, establishing the protectorate vested Britain with external 
sovereignty over Bechuanaland, but it did not automatically vest Britain 
with either internal sovereignty or title to lands within the Protectorate’s 
borders. Britain acquired some measure of internal sovereignty, however 
questionably and incompletely, through the 1891 Order and 
Proclamation.126 Under international law, some further act by municipal 
law was required to obtain title over territory in the Protectorate.127 This 
the 10th day of June, 1891, shall be deemed to apply, or to have applied, to the said 
Protectorate unless specially applied thereto by Proclamation. 
 125. See, e.g., Pain, supra note 115, at 163–64; TSHOSA, supra note 119.  
 126. See supra notes 105, 106 and accompanying text; see also TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 39–40. 
 127. As Lindley explained, “[a]s regards protectorates, it is clear that the transfer of the external 
sovereignty only does not entitle the protecting Power to deal with the property within the protected 
territory . . . any rights which the protecting Power possesses in regard to property must be based upon, 
and limited by, agreement with the local authority.” LINDLEY, supra note 97, at 337. Moreover, a 
similar view was held regarding title and the acquisition of internal sovereignty; that is, as a matter of 
international law, the occupation of a country did not automatically vest the occupying country with 
title. Consider for example Oppenheim’s view: 
A question of some importance is how far occupation affects private property of the 
inhabitants of the occupied territory. As according to the modern conception of State territory, 
the latter is not identical with private property of the State, occupation only brings a territory 
under the sovereignty of the occupying State, and therefore does not affect existing private 
property of the inhabitants. In the age of discoveries, occupation was indeed considered to 
include a title to property over the whole occupied land; but nowadays this can no longer be 
maintained. Being now their sovereign, the occupying State may impose any burdens it likes 
on its new subjects, and may, therefore, even confiscate their private property; but 
occupation, as a mode of acquiring territory, does not of itself affect private property thereon. 
If the Municipal Law of the occupying State does give it a title to private property over the 
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type of domestic law presumably could not be enacted without first having 
internal sovereignty. The distinction between sovereignty and title in 
international law,128 however, did not have equal status under English 
colonial law. 
Because of feudal influences and the notion that the Crown ultimately 
owned all of the land in England, acquisition of sovereignty under English 
law was linked to propriety rights in a way that depended on the method of 
acquisition and whether territory acquired was occupied.129 If lands were 
unoccupied, terra nullius, then acquisition of sovereignty vested the 
Crown with absolute title.130 If the lands were already occupied, and 
acquisition occurred by conquest or cession, then the Crown received the 
public property rights of the former ruler and also the power at the time of 
conquest or cession to seize private property.131 Different principles 
applied to protected states and protectorates, however, in virtue of lying 
beyond the Crown’s dominion,132 and it is likely that, to acquire title, the 
Crown would have needed to gain internal or complete sovereignty over 
the Protectorate. The Crown could then exercise its prerogative through an 
act of state to seize territory, or subsequently to annex it through its 
legislative powers.  
The question of whether internal sovereignty is needed to gain title 
was, in effect, made moot in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, by the 
decision Rex v. Earl of Crewe ex parte Sekgome, which held that unlimited 
British jurisdiction existed as of 1891.133 In particular, the court ruled that 
whole occupied land, such a title is not based on International Law.  
LAASA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 390 (3d ed. 1920).  
 128. See also discussion in WESTLAKE, supra note 116, at 86–90. 
 129. See generally MCNEIL, supra note 109, at Ch. 4 “Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty.” 
 130. Id. at 135. 
 131. Id. at 162 n.10. Acquisition of new territory by act of state is a prerogative power of the 
Crown. Id. at 131, 162. Once the territory became part of British dominion and its inhabitants became 
British subjects, the Crown could no longer by act of state seize property, although it retained 
legislative powers to extinguish property rights until the introduction of English law or the creation of 
a legislative assembly. Id. at 164.  
 132. See, e.g., id. at 110. 
 133. R v. Earl of Crewe (ex parte Sekgome), 2 K.B. 577 (1910). See generally A.J.G.M. Sanders, 
Sekgoma Letsholathebe’s Detention and the Betrayal of a Protectorate, 23 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 
348 (1990); TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 40. The Sekgome decision concerned the British detention in 
Gaborone, under the High Commissioner’s power to provide for the “peace, order and good 
government” of the Protectorate following the 1891 proclamation, of the Chief Sekgome of the 
Tawana tribe. The Chief was considered a threat to the peace after a struggle for the chieftainship. 
After denial of his challenge by a court in the northern Cape, Sekgome applied for a writ of habeas 
corpus to the Divisional Court of the King’s Bench (which also rejected the request), and then 
appealed to the Court of Appeal. The three judges gave separate judgments but agreed that the appeal 
should be dismissed. Sekgome, 2 K.B. at 603.  
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although the Bechuanaland Protectorate was a foreign country which had 
not been settled, conquered, ceded, or annexed, it nonetheless was “under 
His Majesty’s dominion in the sense of power and jurisdiction, [though] 
not under his dominion in the sense of territorial dominion.”134 This 
judicial interpretation of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act declined to limit the 
Act as providing only for extraterritorial jurisdiction over British subjects 
absent specific agreement.135 Instead, it declared support for “the 
interpretation [of jurisdiction] which has been acted upon for so many 
years in Orders of Council and the proclamations thereunder applying to 
the provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act . . . to natives of such 
foreign countries as well as to British subjects . . . .”136 The court thus 
upheld the validity of a protocol that the Crown had, in effect, unrestricted 
jurisdiction over the Protectorate, even though Britain had not acquired the 
Protectorate as a “territorial dominion.”137 The Crown could therefore 
legislate over and subject to its administration all the inhabitants of 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. This decision, although it interpreted the 1891 
Proclamation, was actually made in 1910, after the Crown had made its 
first acquisitions of property. It nonetheless laid the legal framework for 
the wholesale annexation of the Crown lands in which the San largely 
resided.138 The Sekgome decision illustrates how the colonial powers 
twisted the classical concept of the protectorate in international law to suit 
their own expansionist purposes.139  
 134. Id. at 603–04. 
 135. Id. at 596. See also WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON THE FOREIGN POWERS AND 
JURISDICTION OF THE BRITISH CROWN (1894). 
 136. Sekgome, supra note 117, at 596. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. As Oppenheim explained, 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the desire of States to acquire as colonies vast 
territories which they were not at once able to occupy effectively led to agreements with the 
chiefs of natives inhabiting unoccupied territories, by which these chiefs committed 
themselves to the “protectorate” of States that are members of the Family of Nations. These 
so-called protectorates are certainly not protectorates in the technical sense of the term, which 
denotes that relationship between a strong and a weak State where by a treaty the weak State 
has put itself under the protection of the strong and transferred to the latter the management of 
its more important international relations. Neither can they be compared with the protectorate 
which members of the Family of Nations exercise over such non-Christian States as are 
outside that family, because the respective chiefs of natives are not the heads of States, but 
heads of tribal communities only. Such agreements, although they are named “protectorates,” 
are nothing else than steps taken to exclude other Powers from occupying the respective 
territories. They give, like discovery, an inchoate title, and are the precursors of future 
occupations. 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 127, at 388.  
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Three types of land holdings were eventually recognized by the 
Protectorate Administration: freehold title, Crown lands, and “Native 
Reserves.”140 This tripartite division would remain largely intact until after 
independence. Establishing freehold title for white farmers and Cecil 
Rhodes’ British South Africa Company came first. The Administration set 
up a court to receive claims of white settlers supposedly based on chiefs’ 
grants to settlers.141 Successful petitioners were imbued with freehold title 
despite “subsequent protests by some of the African grantors,” some of 
whom “could not truly have intended to give away rights in land which 
they could hardly comprehend.”142 In 1898, the British South Africa 
company, seeking to stem German expansion from the colony of South 
West Africa, brought Boer families to settle in the Ghanzi district on a 
leasehold basis. The settlement in the Ghanzi lands, traditionally inhabited 
by the Nharo San, was based on concessions by the Tawana, whose 
sovereignty over the area was nonetheless questionable. Thus “the 
administration adopted the argument that the land in any event was terra 
incognita,” despite what probably was an intrusion into Nharo lands.143 
The great majority of the land in the Protectorate was not converted into 
freehold, and nearly all was converted into tribal reserves or Crown (and 
then State) lands.144  
The first “Native Reserves” were designated by proclamation in 1899, 
for the Kwena, Ngwakwetse, Ngwato, Kgatla, and Tawana, five of the 
eight most powerful Tswana tribes.145 The tribal reserves “generally 
attempted to recreate and preserve traditional territories and tenurial 
practices” of the locally dominant Tswana tribe, and within the reserves 
the tribes maintained substantial autonomy over land administration.146 
 140. See also discussion in Frimpong, supra note 80, at 385. 
 141. Proc (Nov. 15, 1893), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, at 
65–69. See also Ng’ong’ola, Land Rights for Marginalized Ethnic Groups in Botswana, with Special 
Reference to the Basarwa, 41 J. AFR. L. 1, 6 (1997). 
 142. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 7. 
 143. Id. at 8. Other lands secured under freehold title included those in the Tati district obtained 
by concession from the Matebele Chief, “who was controversially recognized as the political 
sovereign for the area.” The lands near the Transvaal in the southeast were granted to railroad magnate 
Cecil Rhodes in 1905 and 1911; in return for the grant, Rhodes offered to underwrite some of the 
Protectorate’s administrative costs. Id at 7. See Proc No. 4 (Feb. 7,1905), in BECHUANALAND 
PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, at 139; Proc No. 2 (Jan. 2, 1911), in BECHUANALAND 
PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, at 251–59.  
 144. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 8.  
 145. Proc No. 9 (Mar. 29, 1899), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, 
at 115–18. The other major tribes, the Malete, the Tlokwa and Barolong, had their lands designated 
accordingly in 1909, 1933 and 1935.  
 146. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 8. The exceptions regard the creation of tribal territories in 
land not traditionally acknowledged as tribal, namely the creation of the Tati and Tlokwa reserves 
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Over the next three decades four more tribal reserves were created, but, in 
total, eight of the nine reserves were set aside for the eight most powerful 
Tswana tribes.147 No tribal reserves were established for the San, despite 
their status as first occupants; even though the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve was created in 1961, it did not, in practice, provide the same 
security as did the tribal reserves.  
Lands other than tribal reserves and freehold were almost entirely 
designated as Crown lands. In 1904, Britain made its first acquisition of 
title based on parcels from the Kwena, Ngwaketse, and Ngwato (Tswana) 
tribes.148 The Preamble to the 1904 Order declared that “whereas the 
Crown had jurisdiction over Bechuanaland Protectorate,”149 and “whereas 
the Chiefs Khama of the Bamangwato, Sebele of the Bakwena, and 
Bathoen of the Bangwaketsi, have abandoned all rights and jurisdiction in 
and over certain portion of their former territories;” therefore “His 
Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers on this behalf by ‘The 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890’ or otherwise in His Majesty vested,” 
demarcated the Crown lands.150 The Order vested “all rights of His 
Majesty in or in relation to any Crown lands” in the South African High 
Commissioner.151 In describing the boundaries of the lands the Order 
mentioned “Native Reserves and territories” which “have been or shall be 
more particularly described” by Proclamation.152  
The most comprehensive and controversial annexation of lands was 
made by a 1910 Order153 that covered large swaths of the territory 
inhabited by San groups. The Order declared that “[i]n addition to the 
Crown Lands defined” by the 1904 Order (i.e., the parcels from three 
from freehold land by Proc No. 2 of 1911. Proc No. 2, supra note 143.  
 147. Ng’ong’ola, supra 141, at 10. On the whole reserves were created for the Kwena, Ngwaketse, 
Ngwato, Tawana, Kgatla, Malete, Tlokwa, and a ninth reserve was created in the Baralong farms area 
in the south. Proc No. 28 (Nov. 3, 1909), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 
105, at 205. See also Proc No. 44 (1933); Proc No. 77 (1935), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 
1891–1914, supra note 105. 
 148. Orders in Council (May 16, 1904), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, at 5–6, 
supra note 105; see also Bishop, supra note 60, at 106. 
 149. It employed the same language as the earlier legislation. See, e.g., Orders in Council (May 9, 
1891), supra note 105. 
 150. Orders in Council (May 16, 1904), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra 
note 105. 
 151. Id. 
 152. The lands from this first acquisition were eventually transferred as freehold to the British 
South Africa company for its railway project. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 10 n.43. See Proc No. 4 
(Feb. 7, 1905), supra note 143 (declaring that “the property of and in all lands within the boundaries 
described in the Schedule . . . shall . . . be vested in the Company absolute”). 
 153. Order in Council of (Jan. 10, 1910), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra 
note 105, at 9. 
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Tswana tribes), “all other land situate within the limits of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate,” with the exception of the Tati District,154 
“native reserves,” specific grants on behalf of the Crown, and the Baralong 
farms, shall “vest in His Majesty’s High Commissioner for South Africa 
and be subject to all the provisions of the said Order in Council as Crown 
Lands.”155 In this regard, the 1910 Order “had the effect of vesting in his 
Majesty’s High Commissioner vast expanses of territory which had not 
been secured for the Crown in the required legal manner,” “effectively 
claim[ing] title to land belonging to Basarwa, Kgalagadi and other 
voiceless minority groups.”156 
The implication of this legislation for the San was that their traditional 
territories now sat in the Crown lands or Tswana tribal reserves (or, as was 
the case for some of the lands of the Nharo San of western Botswana, 
freehold estates held by white farmers). Although tribes in the “native 
reserves” retained substantial autonomy over the administration of land 
and were allowed to continue use of customary law and procedures,157 this 
did not substantially enhance the rights of the San, for as noted earlier 
Tswana custom excluded San claims. Patterns of San occupation in Crown 
lands for the most part continued “without significant perceptible 
changes,” but traditional land rights were not as secure as they were in 
reserves.158 The administration generally did not demand rent for use or 
occupation, but at the same time it did not find it necessary to consult, or 
for that matter compensate, communities when it used the lands for other 
purposes. As Ng’ong’ola remarks, “the fiction of terra incognita, first 
encountered in the demarcation of the Ghanzi freehold farms, was 
steadfastly asserted.”159 With the exception of conversion of some Crown 
 154. The Tati District was later annexed as Crown land. Orders in Council (May 4, 1911), in 
BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, at 13, supra note 105.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Clement Ng’ong’ola & Batlhalefi Moeletsi, The Legal Framework for the Assessment of 
Land Rights for Basarwa and Other Marginalized Ethnic Groups in Botswana, in NORAD’S SUPPORT 
OF THE REMOTE AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME IN BOTSWANA 20–21 (1996), quoted in 
SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 98. Ng’ong’ola is correct that the Order included lands in what are now 
Ghanzi and Kgalagadi districts, among others that significant San populations traditionally inhabit. 
The Order did not provide any details about the legal basis of acquisition, merely adding the usual 
preamble about jurisdiction. Nonetheless, as explained in the aboriginal title part, I disagree with 
Ng’ong’ola’s claim that title was vested in the Crown and that the San became “tenants at will,” for I 
think the stronger case is that no extinguishment was made by the 1910 order itself, whatever its future 
consequences. 
 157. See Frimpong, supra note 80, at 387 (commenting that “[i]t was basically this [customary] 
system of land tenure that the British sought to preserve by the creation of the native reserves, and the 
system remained operational until the country became independent.”). 
 158. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 10. 
 159. Id. 
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lands into tribal land, the basic division of tribal reserves, Crown (now 
State) lands, and freehold estates has remained basically intact. 
C. The Creation of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve 
Because virtually no lands had been expressly set aside for San 
groups,160 an especially important development was the 1961 creation of 
the CKGR, which at 52,347 square kilometers is the largest protected area 
in Botswana and one of the largest protected areas in Africa.161 The CKGR 
was established partly based on the recommendation of the Protectorate’s 
“Bushman Survey Officer” George Silberbauer, who conducted a study of 
the San inhabitants, primarily the G/wi and G//ana, and the marginalized 
Tswana Kgalagadi tribe in the Ghanzi district in which the CKGR is 
located.162 The Ghanzi district, which occupies a large portion of western 
Botswana, consisted of Crown lands under the 1910 Order,163 as well as 
freehold farms in the west granted to Afrikaaner settlers in 1899.164 The 
Ghanzi farm economy grew in the early twentieth century, and during this 
period most of the San either worked on the farms as laborers or moved to 
other parts of the district, including the area that is now the CKGR. The 
result “was a restructuring of the social landscape of the Ghanzi region and 
the marginalization and impoverishment of a sizable proportion of the 
[region’s] San population.”165 Silberbauer’s report makes clear that 
farming provided jobs but also reduced the availability of game and land. 
Moreover, wages for herding fell, as farmers fenced their lands and hired 
higher-skill Tswana labor.166 It thus became increasingly evident that 
social and economic transformation, whatever its benefits, threatened 
traditional lifestyles of the San.167 
 160. In a few instances, small settlements were created before the creation of the CKGR. The 
Olifantskloof settlement lasted only two years, and a similar fate befell the government settlement at 
Letlhkane in the eastern Kalahari. It was established for San who wished to raise crops and included a 
school. HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 23. 
 161. High Comm’r Notice No. 33 (1961); Fauna Conservation Proc. No. 22 § 1(A)(5); First 
Schedule (1961). See also Erni, supra note 27, at 8. 
 162. GEORGE B. SILBERBAUER, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BECHUANALAND ON THE 
BUSHMAN SURVEY (1965). Although the Survey was not published until 1965, Silberbauer’s research 
began in 1958. Id. at 8.  
 163. Orders in Council (May 4, 1911), supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 164. See Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies, supra note 24.  
 165. Id. 
 166. SILBERBAUER, supra note 162, at 118, 121. 
 167. The idea of setting aside land for San struck officials after a series of investigations into the 
serf status of San were made in the 1920s and 1930s by entities including the British government, the 
League of Nations, and the International Labor Organization, as well as the Protectorate 
administration. Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies, supra note 24; Hitchcock & Holm, supra 
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Silberbauer’s “Bushman Survey Report” emphasized the importance of 
conserving land for the San inhabitants of the CKGR area “who have 
expressed their wish to remain where they are, in their present 
environment, and who wish to continue to follow their present life of 
hunter-foodgatherers.”168 Silberbauer stressed that the aim was “to allow 
[the San] the right of choice of the life they wish to follow.”169 A similar 
perspective on San autonomy was later espoused in various National 
Development Plans and papers on rural development.170 Despite 
Silberbauer’s emphasis on the creation of a protected zone for San 
groups,171 the Protectorate Administration in establishing the CKGR 
weakened the provisions protecting the San and instead focused on 
wildlife conservation.172 The 1961 Fauna Conservation Proclamation did 
make an exception to its prohibition against hunting in the CKGR for the 
“reasonable food requirements” of subsistence hunters,173 and also 
excepted hunters from the license requirement,174 but Silberbauer’s 
recommendations were largely ignored when the regulations over entry to 
the CKGR were promulgated.175 Draft provisions to secure land rights for 
the San were struck,176 and the only concession specifically granted to 
them was a right for “Bushm[e]n indigenous to the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve” to enter the CKGR without first obtaining a permit from the 
Ghanzi District Commissioner.177 The CKGR regulations also limited the 
San hunting privileges set forth in the Fauna Conservation Proclamation 
and proscribed residents from keeping domestic animals, even though 
note 52, at 315. 
 168. SILBERBAUER, supra note 162, at 133. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See, e.g., Hitchcock, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 24, at 303. 
 171. This emphasis is not only evident from the cited passages, but also from how the deliberately 
titled “Bushman Survey Report” had as its central focus the San. 
 172. On the other hand, a letter from the Resident Commissioner to the High Commissioner in 
South Africa stressed that it was important to “protect the food supplies of the existing Bushmen 
population in this area which has been estimated to approximately 4,000 from the activities of the 
European farming community at Ghanzi . . . .” Government Savingram No. 10840 111 (25) of 
February 9, 1961 from the Resident Commissioner of Mafeking to the High Commissioner of Cape 
Town, quoted in “Update on the Situation of the CKGR Residents of Botswana”, at 
http://www.kalahari peoples.org/documents/RKHCKGRupdate.02.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). 
 173. Fauna Conservation Proc., supra note 161, § 4. 
 174. Id. § 57(4). 
 175. Central Kalahari Game Reserve—Control of Entry Regulations, GN 38 of 1963. 
 176. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 11; SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 31. 
 177. Bishop, supra note 60, at 113; GN 38 of 1963, supra note 175. It was thus up to the 
government to decide what San were indigenous to the CKGR. Given the relative mobility of many 
San, it can be seen how it could have been manipulated by officials to exclude them. Id. 
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some residents had dogs they used for hunting.178 The Administration’s 
early divergence from Silberbauer’s emphasis on protecting San lands had 
important ramifications, as it foreshadowed the government’s later 
rationalization of policies that further limited the rights of CKGR residents 
but purported to protect wildlife.179  
The weakness of San hunting rights in the CKGR reflected broader 
inequities over hunting regulation. The Protectorate administration 
accorded the major Tswana tribes substantial autonomy in hunting 
regulation but gave no such autonomy to San groups (although San did 
continue to hunt).180 Although San in Tswana lands had some of the 
customary rights that the Tswana possessed, as against the Protectorate 
administration, those in Crown lands, including the Ghanzi, Chobe, and 
Kgalagadi districts, did not.181 Residents of areas within Crown lands, like 
the San in the CKGR, instead were subjected to greater bureaucratic 
control.182 The Protectorate passed a series of highly restrictive hunting 
laws that applied to those of European descent and non-tribal groups, 
including, by implication, the San.183 In particular, the latter, under a 1904 
Proclamation, could exempt themselves from certain regulations only by 
showing they had a “Paramount Chief” who could permit them to hunt,184 
an inapt standard that was difficult for the San to meet given their 
 178. Bishop, supra note 60, at 113. 
 179. Spinage suggests that Silberbauer’s recommendation of a reserve for the San was rejected 
partly because it would have been opposed by white farmers in Ghanzi to the west, and the Ngwato to 
the east, who depended heavily on San labor that they did not wish to see depart. SPINAGE, supra note 
89, at 60. Although the San’s progressive expulsion from the CKGR has recently received media 
attention, from the 1930s to 1970s San groups were removed from other national parks and game 
reserves. Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies, supra note 24. The impetus for the creation of 
game reserves in Botswana and the passage of the 1940 enabling legislation came from the 1933 
Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in Their Natural State, known as the 
London Convention, and a following 1938 conference. See LNTS 172 1936, 241–72. The London 
Convention of course included Britain as a party and its provisions, under article I(1)–(3), thus 
extended to the Bechuanaland Protectorate as a territory under Britain’s protection. Id. 
 180. Tribal autonomy was the policy when the British acquired jurisdiction over Bechuanaland 
Protectorate in 1885. The first Assistant Commissioner was directed “not to interfere with the Native 
Administration; the Chiefs are understood not to be desirous of parting with their rights of sovereignty, 
nor are Her Majesty’s Government by any means anxious to assume the responsibilities of it.” 
SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 11. For a policy codified in the May 1891 Orders in Council, see supra 
note 105 and accompanying text. 
 181. In 1891 the administration directed its jurisdiction, with a few exceptions, not to extend tribal 
reserves, given the absence of an appropriate treaty provision. No such limitation, however, was 
provided for Crown lands which were therefore subject to proclamations and other means of 
regulation. See Orders in Council of May 9, 1891, supra note 105.  
 182. See also Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 10. 
 183. The laws started with the 1886 Game Law and 1891 Game Law (Amendment) Act.  
 184. Proc. No. 22, (Sept. 24, 1904), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 
105, at 138. See also SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 30. 
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comparatively non-stratified social organization.185 Otherwise the San 
were subject to the Game Law Act’s requirement of hunting licenses, its 
definitions of hunting seasons, and its restrictions on the species that could 
be hunted, as well as the constraints imposed by the Act’s amendments.186 
Although after 1910 the Protectorate had jurisdiction over tribal reserves 
and could regulate their hunting practices, it generally chose not to do so, 
preserving tribal autonomy with only narrow exceptions, while continually 
introducing new regulations for other lands.187 Many of these regulations 
may have reasonably been motivated by the desire to curb the rapid 
decline in wildlife stocks, as Spinage for example notes the “appalling 
destruction” that occurred in the nineteenth century “encouraged by 
European traders.”188 Yet, the regulations were adopted with little 
consideration for, or input from, the San, a problem that has continued to 
afflict Botswana’s regulation of hunting.189  
It was not until 1940 that the Protectorate Administration recognized 
the distinctive needs of subsistence hunters in Crown lands, when 
residents of the Kgalagadi District were allowed to apply for a permit to 
hunt “in reasonable quantities for food.”190 Moreover, the 1961 Fauna 
Conservation Proclamation—which overhauled hunting regulation, 
introduced new restrictions, license requirements and quotas; expanded 
enforcement powers; and increased scheduled protected species—applied 
almost exclusively to areas outside of Tswana tribal reserves,191 that is, 
Crown lands and freeholds, the former of which included many San 
inhabitants. Tribes controlling the reserve lands were allowed to develop 
their own regulations.192 No broader exception for subsistence hunters was 
 185. See SAUGESTAD, supra note 21. As Saugestad remarks, the “fluid composition of Bushmen 
bands and leadership based on consensus has made it difficult for outsiders to identify positions of 
leadership.” In the same respect, it made San leadership appear “weak” in contrast to the hierarchical, 
stratified structure of the Tswana. Supra note 21, at 91. 
 186. SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 13–15 (listing a host of proclamations and notices regulating 
hunting from 1891 to the Fauna Conservation Proc of 1961); Game Law Amendment Act 1886, §§ 2, 
3, 4. 
 187. See, e.g., SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 14–16. 
 188. Id. at 26–27. 
 189. Hunting laws were overhauled by proclamation in 1925 and again in 1940. Proc. No. 17 and 
Proc. No. 19. The latter law, the Bechuanaland Protectorate Game Proclamation, was enacted in 
response to the 1933 London Convention. Supra note 179. It enabled the creation of game reserves 
(such as the future CKGR) and introduced fees for licenses to hunt small game. Id. Neither made 
exception for the San.  
 190. High Comm’r Notice No. 42. See also SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 30. 
 191. Fauna Conservation Proc. § 4, stating that “except where the context requires otherwise, this 
Proclamation shall not apply to Africans in tribal territories.” Supra note 161. Exceptions included 
§ 62 on the export and import of game and § 65(4) on dealing in trophies. Id. 
 192. SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 29. Nonetheless the San regulations tended to reflect the 1961 
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provided until the 1967 Fauna Conservation Amendments.193 As 
Ng’ong’ola concludes regarding the pre-independence era, “[t]he 
underlying premise of the numerous statutes, rules, and regulations was 
that no one had an inherent or indigenous right to hunt or gather on Crown 
lands.”194 
In part because of the absence of targeted, beneficial land reforms and 
the refusal to acknowledge San hunting rights, conditions for the San 
improved only in certain areas with the creation of Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. San serfdom remained widespread at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, and although the Protectorate banned it in 1936, it 
continued without formal sanction into the 1950s.195 Administration 
officials expressed concern from time to time about the slavery-like status 
of relations between some San and Tswana, but more often they shifted 
responsibility to Tswana leaders instead of undertaking real reforms.196  
Proclamation’s provisions. Id. 
 193. See SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 179. See also 1967 Fauna Conservation Protection 
Amendment, supra note 161. 
 194. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 10. 
 195. Proc. No. 15 of 1936. Russell cites the following position of the Ngwato District 
Commissioner: 
[T]he most important accomplishment of the past year has been the announcement to 
thousands of Masarwa by an official that they are free . . . On the whole I think the position of 
the Masarwas as observed by me . . . is fairly satisfactory . . . It is true that they do not obtain 
much in the way of payment for their services but their work is not difficult and they are quite 
contented . . . I do not think we should try to revolutionise their evolution. Present conditions 
are favourable for the Masarwa to improve themselves . . . The time will arrive when they 
will not be willing to work for almost nothing, and then their masters will have the choice of 
paying them or losing their services. 
District Commissioner, Serowe, Oct. 3, 1936 “Comment on the Masarwa Census,” quoted in Margo 
Russell, Slaves or Workers? Relations Between Bushmen, Tswana and Boers in the Kalahari, 2 J. S. 
AFR. STUD. 178, 184–85 (1976). Some key reforms were undertaken by Tswana leaders like Khama 
III, who mandated that the San be compensated with cattle for their labor. In 1911, he prohibited the 
payment of tribute by San clients to their Tswana patrons; other Tswana chiefs such as Chief 
Gaseitsiwe of the Ngwaketse and Chief Sebele I of the Kwena followed suit. Hitchcock, supra note 14, 
at 20.  
 196. HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 21. Indeed sometimes officials 
expressed reservations about the liberation of Basarwa. Hitchcock provides an excerpt of the following 
1928 letter from the Resident Magistrate in Francistown to the Government Secretary: 
[I]t seems to me that the sudden release of more or less savage Masarwa who have been under 
control and authority of their lords and masters, the Bechuana, may wander around the 
country stealing and killing cattle when they feel inclined, and if they collect together in big 
communities . . . the Government may have a difficult business at hand. 
Id. (quoting Letter from Resident Magistrate in Francistown to the Governor Secretary in Mafking 
(Nov. 12, 1928)), in Botswana National Archives file S.43/7. 
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VI. THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA: BUILDING A NATION BUT 
NEGLECTING HISTORY 
The demise of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the establishment of 
an independent Republic of Botswana in 1966 set the stage for intense 
efforts to build a nation in what was then one of the world’s poorest 
countries. Constitutionalism, land reform, infrastructure creation, 
economic development, environmental and conservation provisions, social 
policy, and other ambitious initiatives played key parts in this enterprise. 
Although this effort proved successful along many dimensions, as 
Botswana’s remarkable development record attests, in other respects it has 
dramatically failed San groups. This failure, like the subordination of San 
groups in the Protectorate period, cannot be attributed to any single factor. 
An overarching problem in the post-independence period, however, has 
been the government’s resistance to acknowledging the contingencies of 
history and ethnicity, in favor of visions of a developed, ethnicity-blind 
state. This problem has impeded the rectification of past inequities 
discussed in prior sections and has prevented effective protection against 
new threats to San groups. I will discuss four elements of the 
government’s agenda that have particularly affected the San.197 The first 
element was the creation of a strong anti-discrimination regime that made 
recognition of tribal and ethnic differences difficult (even in response to 
past injustices), but that at the same time elevated the status of dominant 
Tswana tribes in certain respects. The second element was land reform, 
which weakened direct Tswana control over land in some ways, but which 
also introduced new problems and again declined to recognize San land 
rights. The third element consisted of hunting regulation, which finally 
recognized subsistence hunters’ needs in 1967, but then progressively 
burdened them with additional requirements. The fourth element was 
development and social policy, which provided some benefits but also 
created government dependence and thus government influence, which 
was ultimately used as a lever in moving San groups out of the Central 
Kalahari Game Reserve.  
 197. It should be noted that the first part of the paper represents an extension of this analysis, 
bringing us to contemporary conditions.  
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A. An Ethnicity-Blind Antidiscrimination Regime 
Botswana’s independence in 1966 brought the adoption of a 
constitution with strong anti-discrimination provisions. In particular, 
section 15(1) states that “no law shall make any provision that is 
discriminatory either of itself or in its effect,”198 and (2) provides that “no 
person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by 
virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any 
public office or any public authority.”199 The term “discriminatory” is 
defined by subsection (3), which specifies that it means: 
affording different treatment to different persons, attributable 
wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, 
place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed whereby persons 
of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to 
which persons of another such description are not made subject or 
are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to 
persons of another such description.200 
The language of this provision, with its focus on differential treatment, 
appears to make it difficult for affirmative measures to be enacted in favor 
of certain ethnic or racial groups. Some exceptions to the prohibition are 
set forth, starting in subsection (4). Subsection (4) exempts from 
application laws that make provision “for the application in the case of 
members of a particular race or tribe of customary law with respect to any 
matter” that excludes any laws regarding the matter that otherwise would 
apply.201 The exception for the application of customary law could be 
effective if San customary law were afforded greater recognition, but in 
most contexts such a provision likely operates to benefit the more 
powerful Tswana groups. Subsection (4) also allows for divergences from 
the prohibitions of subsections (1) and (2) that are “reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society.”202 Although the text of section 15(3) closely read 
does not seem to bode especially well for affirmative measures, one could 
persuasively argue that some of these measures would be “reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society,” because properly designed affirmative 
support for historically oppressed minorities is likely to contribute to 
 198. BOTSWANA CONST. § 15(1). 
 199. Id. § 15(2). 
 200. Id. § 15(3). 
 201. Id. § 15(4)(d). 
 202. Id. § 15(4)(e), and § 15(6). A few limited and specific exceptions are made, for example, for 
service qualifications for public officers. Id. § 15(5). 
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democratic values. The San, as discussed above, were subjected to decades 
of political exclusion and economic exploitation. The formal establishment 
of democratic institutions has not adequately realized their political voice, 
providing some basis for consideration of affirmative measures falling 
under section 15(4). 
Botswana’s antidiscrimination regime has affected Botswana ethnic 
groups in different ways. In some respects, it has strengthened Tswana 
cultural norms at the expense of other groups. The government has 
stressed that all persons are first and foremost citizens of Botswana, but, as 
Saugestad points out, “this meant that the culture and language of the 
numerically dominant Tswana people became the dominant symbol” for 
the nation. “Basarwa” identity, by contrast, “simply does not exist as a 
category in official documents and discourse.”203 Notwithstanding its 
ethnicity-blind aspirations and rhetoric, the government’s strategy has 
been to suppress the tribal identities of non-Tswana groups while elevating 
certain features of Tswana culture, such as the Setswana language, to 
national norms, obscuring their contingent ethnic character and making 
them instruments for national development.204 The nation-building 
imperative and the wish to avoid anything resonating with the legacy of 
South African apartheid have deeply informed the government’s approach 
toward the San, as the government has consistently refused to 
acknowledge the particular aspects of San culture and history, and instead 
has focused on assimilating San groups into the broader society. 
Especially telling is the following statement from the government’s recent 
report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:  
Having had to contend with racist regimes in the then South Africa, 
Rhodesia and South West Africa for a long time, and having 
interacted with people raised in those societies, Botswana was 
always determined to give due regard, in the formulation of 
education and land planning policy and other matters, to ensuring 
 203. SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 177. 
 204. Botswana’s report to the CERD committee declares that the “population of Botswana is 
comparatively and generally homogenous” and that while “several other languages [are] spoken in the 
country,” “Setswana,” the national language, “is . . . spoken by over 96 [percent] of the population,” 
including many non-Tswana who seek expanded language rights. Fourteenth Periodic Reports of 
States Parties Due in 2001: Botswana, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/407/Add. 1 (May 8, 2002), at 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Apr. 14, 2004). The government of Botswana’s predilection 
for not considering ethnicity or tribal status in general, while nonetheless elevating the status of certain 
(Tswana) tribes, is reminiscent of the nation building strategies pursued in other African countries that 
have suppressed potentially fractionalizing ethnic and tribal identities to the end of promoting 
consensus or majoritarianism.  
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that race relations are normal. For example, in integrating foreign 
investors, minorities and remote area dwellers into the mainstream 
of society, emphasis is placed on shared public amenities such as 
schools, medical facilities and utilities, as well as on mixed 
neighbourhoods so designed by settlement planners. Everyone, 
regardless of their ethnicity or race, is free to settle anywhere in the 
country within the parameter of the law and policy. This way, 
friendship, tolerance and understanding are developed among ethnic 
groups.205 
The government’s concern for avoiding anything resonating with 
apartheid in the provision of benefits, neighborhood design, and other 
areas is obviously compelling. What is questionable, however, is the 
assumption that avoiding apartheid, and ensuring “normal” race relations 
(a notably vague expression), entails that remote area dwellers and 
minorities should be integrated “into the mainstream of society,” 
particularly when the terms of integration are dictated by outside actors. 
The potential for conflict between integrative ideals and the freedom to 
“settle anywhere in the country” is exhibited by the government’s policy 
of expelling residents from the CKGR in the name of providing them with 
more benefits.206  
B. Land Reform  
The second element of Botswana’s nation-building strategy that has 
deeply affected the San is land reform. With the Republic of Botswana’s 
founding, the Crown lands of the Bechuanaland Protectorate became State 
lands, accounting for about forty-seven percent of Botswana’s total 
territory at independence.207 More importantly, however, the government 
significantly modified for the first time since the early twentieth century 
the administration of the forty-eight percent of Botswana constituted by 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. The CERD report shows how the government fails to recognize the relevance of major 
social and historical differences distinguishing Botswana. Unlike South Africa, it was never heavily 
settled by a subsequently dominant white population. One might have hoped for the government to 
recognize the difference between providing remedial measures for historically oppressed indigenous 
peoples and ratifying racial domination by descendants of formal imperial powers. It is ironic that 
South Africa, notwithstanding the bitter legacy of apartheid, has in some respects made greater 
progress in acknowledging the unique history of its San inhabitants, for example, through the transfer 
of tens of thousands of hectares of land to the Khomani San. 
 207. State Land Act, Law No. 29 of 1966. The percentage has since fallen with some State lands 
being converted into Tribal lands, but the former still account for a large portion of Botswana’s 
territory. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 11. 
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tribal lands.208 The Tribal Land Act (TLA), the first pillar of Botswana’s 
land framework, did not alter the basic distinction in Tswana customary 
law among residential, arable, and grazing land.209 It did, however, shift 
authority over the allocation and regulation of tribal land from chiefs and 
other tribal leaders to formally neutral, but nonetheless Tswana-
dominated, land boards that were empowered to dispense customary and 
common law land grants.210 A land board was established for each of the 
nine tribal reserves designated by the Protectorate government,211 as well 
as for Tati concession, and the Chobe, Kgalagadi, and Ghanzi districts.212  
The TLA vested “[a]ll right and title” to the land of each tribal reserve 
to its corresponding land board “in trust for the benefit and advantage of 
the tribesmen of that area and for the purpose of promoting the economic 
and social development of all the peoples of Botswana.”213 The TLA 
defined “tribesman” as “a citizen of Botswana who is a member of the 
tribe occupying the tribal area,”214 a definition that reinforced the view 
that the TLA excluded the San and other minority groups from 
consideration and functioned to enhance the power of the locally dominant 
Tswana tribe. Land rights could be granted to non-tribesmen only when 
specifically mandated by the Minister of Lands and Housing.215 The TLA 
vested all powers held by a chief under customary law in the land boards, 
including the power to grant and to cancel land rights, to hear appeals, to 
impose use restrictions,216 and to establish lands outside grazing areas as 
“commonage for the use of tribesmen or for any specified class or 
category thereof.”217 Occupancy of land by customary tenure was 
 208. Tribal Land Act, No. 54 of 1968, in LAWS OF BOTSWANA, Ch. 32:02 [hereinafter TLA]. For 
helpful discussion of the Tribal Land Act and its subsequent amendments, see Kwame Frimpong, The 
Administration of Tribal Lands in Botswana, 30 J. AFR. L. 51 (1986). 
 209. See Frimpong, supra note 80, at 388. 
 210. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 15–16. 
 211. TLA, supra note 208, § 3 and First Schedule. The tribal territories listed are those of the 
Ngwato, Tawana, Kgatleng, Kweneng, Ngwaketse, Malete, Tlokweng, and Barolong Farms. Id. at 
First Schedule. 
 212. The Ghanzi tribal district excluded the CKGR, which was still classified as State land. Tribal 
Land Act, supra note 208, at Fifth Schedule. The government changed the State lands of Chobe, 
Ghanzi, and Kgalagadi to tribal lands by Tribal Land (Amendment) Act No. 21 of 1976 [hereinafter 
TLAA]. This is partly the reason why tribal lands by 1997 had grown to about 70% of the total area of 
Botswana, whereas State lands, primarily allocated for fauna and flora conservation, had shrunk to 
about 25%. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 11, 13. 
 213. TLA, supra note 208, § 10. 
 214. Id. (emphasis added). 
 215. Id. § 20(1). 
 216. Id. § 13(1). 
 217. Id. § 18(1). Land boards were only empowered to describe grazing areas and not to expand, 
limit, or otherwise define them. Id. § 17(3). 
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prohibited until a grant certificate was obtained from the land board.218 
Furthermore, the TLA also imbued land boards with the authority to grant 
common law leaseholds or ownership rights over parcels in tribal lands “to 
any person” in the form of short-term leases determinable on a monthly 
basis and long-term leases requiring the Minister’s written consent.219 The 
scope of these powers is especially important in assessing the viability of 
aboriginal title claims. 
Although one of the purported aims of creating the land board system 
was to democratize access to and control of land in tribal areas, its success 
in this regard has been mixed. On the one hand, individuals do not have to 
obtain land from the ward heads—or consequently, the chief—but only 
need to get their consent for an allocation by the land board.220 The land 
board is not beholden to the chief in the same respect as the ward heads, 
and it may be that allocations do not depend as much on the power of the 
local tribe. On the other hand, the selection procedures of the original TLA 
appeared mainly to shift authority from the chief to the Minister of Lands 
and Housing. One appointment is made by the chief, while six are made 
by the minister (three are from a six-candidate slate elected by the kgotla), 
two are made by district council representatives, and two are made by 
representatives of the Minister on issues of agriculture, commerce, or 
industry.221 Although the structure weakened the Chief’s control over land 
issues, it did not automatically lead to greater accountability for local 
groups, particularly if they did not already exert influence in the kgotla or 
district council. Moreover, the definition of “tribesman,” with its focus on 
“the tribe occupying the tribal area,” may have been used as a rationale to 
exclude minority groups from consideration by Tswana-dominated land 
boards.  
The government made major changes to the TLA in 1993.222 The 
amendments eliminated the TLA’s section 10(2), which made an 
exception from land board jurisdiction for “any land or right water” held 
by a person in his personal or private capacity.223 The effect was to make 
all customary land rights dependent on board approval.224 Most significant, 
 218. Id. §16. 
 219. Id. §§ 23, 24. See discussion in Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 15–16. Section 33 of the TLA 
provided for compensation for takings from customary rightholders. Id. § 33. 
 220. Frimpong, supra note 80, at 388. 
 221. See TLA, supra note 208, First Schedule. 
 222. TLAA, supra note 212. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. § 7(b). The Amendment also authorized the creation of land tribunals to adjudicate 
appeals of land board decisions. Id. § 40. 
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however, was the substitution of “citizens of Botswana” for “tribesmen” in 
section 10 of the TLA, requiring that the land boards hold tribal lands “in 
trust for the benefit and advantage” of the former group rather than the 
latter and for the purpose of promoting the social and economic 
development “of all peoples of Botswana.”225 Nonetheless, as Ng’ong’ola 
points out, subsequent regulations focused more on enhancing the 
minister’s political control of the boards than on accommodating 
customary practices, like hunting, of non-Tswana groups, such as the 
San.226 Bishop notes that “the main concern expressed by the San over this 
new system of land allocation is that the institutions that have power over 
land allocation are still dominated by non-San,” and that they “are still 
considered ‘non-tribesmen’ and ‘lacking in Chiefly organization’ by 
members of the various Tswana tribes who continue to dominate land 
granting institutions and government.”227 Further reforms of the TLA 
framework are likely necessary to ensure that land governance truly 
accommodates the rights of the San and other minority groups over their 
territories.  
The other pillar of the government’s post-independence land policy is 
the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy, instituted in 1975.228 The Tribal Grazing 
Lands Policy (TGLP), has several aims, including reducing overgrazing 
and range degradation, decreasing rural inequality, and promoting 
sustainable growth of the livestock industry.229 By the early 1970s, 
Botswana had experienced a major increase in cattle herds.230 
Improvements in water borehole technology and eagerness to use 
Botswana’s vast veld resources caused a “land-grab” as herds spread 
across the Kalahari. The World Bank-funded TGLP sought to promote 
sustainable economic development by dividing grazing lands into 
commercial, communal, and reserved areas, and encouraging owners of 
large cattle herds to move into the commercial areas where they would 
 225. Id. § 7(a), TLA § 10. This amendment could benefit or disadvantage the San, as it further 
strengthens the view that members of minority groups within a tribal reserve, as “citizens of 
Botswana,” are entitled to land rights just as are members of the locally dominant Tswana tribe. On the 
other hand, it could be interpreted as enabling outside residents of a tribal reserve to enter and seek 
land or water rights from land boards with jurisdiction over minority group lands. Hence, “activists 
and researchers on Basarwa issues [believe] that the 1993 amendment may have been a ploy to allow 
further penetration of remaining Basarwa territories by Tswana cattle barons in need of additional 
cattle post areas.” Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 18 (citing Liz Wily, Hunter-Gatherers in Botswana 
and the Land Issue, 2 INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 12 (1994)). 
 226. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 16–17. 
 227. Bishop, supra note 60, at 119. 
 228. HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 30. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Frimpong, supra note 80, at 390. 
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fence off their ranches under leaseholds and pay rents to the district land 
boards,231 in theory weakening the harmful incentives behind the “tragedy 
of the commons.” Communal areas were to continue as they had under the 
customary system, with cattle owners having non-exclusive usage rights. 
Assessments of the implementation, however, indicated that virtually 
no land was set aside as reserved, even though the government recognized 
that reserved areas were the only “safeguards for the poorer members of 
the population.”232 Commercial ranches, on the other hand, were 
designated in areas containing significant San populations.233 Commercial 
ranchers also used communal land, squeezing out the small cattle owners 
for whom the communal land was intended under the TGLP, or exhausting 
their own resources on commercial leaseholds and then returning their 
herds to communal areas.234  
San groups and their allies responded to the TGLP’s shortcomings with 
a variety of legal claims, an effort to get appendices attached to the TGLP 
“that would allow people continued rights to land for resource 
procurement, residential, and agricultural production purposes,” and an 
attempt to persuade the government and district councils to reserve blocks 
of land large enough to sustain San hunter-gatherers and agriculturalists.235 
The Attorney General’s chambers determined that the appendices were 
illegal, however, and land boards proved reluctant to set aside land for 
people that they viewed as nomadic foragers.236 A consultant to the 
Attorney General’s chambers issued a controversial opinion in 1978. The 
consultant wrote: 
As far as I have been able to ascertain, the Masarwa have always 
been true nomads, owing no allegiance to any Chief or tribe, but 
have ranged far and wide for a very long time over very large areas 
of the kalahari in which they have always had unlimited hunting 
rights, which they even enjoy today in spite of the Fauna 
Conservation Act. The right of the Masarwa to hunt is, of course, 
very important and valuable as hunting is their main source of 
 231. See HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 30. 
 232. Id. at 7. 
 233. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 20. 
 234. Frimpong, supra note 80, at 391. See also discussion in Good, supra note 12, at 214–15. On 
the other hand the regulations in 21(4) required each land board to examine its registry for certificates 
of customary land grants, to certify whether rights exist, and to state whether the owners of such rights 
had been informed of proposed lease and consented. Existing customary rights are likely protected 
under the regulations. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 20–21. 
 235. See HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 31. 
 236. Good, supra note 12, at 213. 
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sustenance . . . without much clearer information it is impossible to 
give a confirmed opinion about the Masarwa. Tentatively, however, 
it appears to me that (a) the true Masarwa can have no rights of any 
kind except rights to hunting.237 
Although it provided some recognition of San hunting rights, the 
opinion delivered a blow to San land advocacy through its explicit use of 
the “nomad” misconception.238 The government nominally disavowed the 
consultant’s suggestion that the San could be denied land rights based on 
ethnic affiliation,239 but it generally did not reverse land board decisions 
that denied San rights.240 Although some Remote Area Dwellers have 
obtained residential rights and rights to fields for agricultural use, water 
and grazing rights in RADP settlements remain with the government. 
Thus, lacking rights of exclusion, Remote Area Dwellers have seen 
numerous people move in with their livestock.241 Moreover, efforts to get 
the new arrivals to leave have tended to fail, partly because some of those 
moving in sit on land boards and district councils.242  
C. Hunting Regulation 
Botswana’s independence saw the enactment of the first broad 
exception for subsistence hunters from hunting restrictions in the 1967 
amendment of the Fauna Conservation Act.243 The amendment stated that, 
subject to contrary regulations for controlled hunting areas and with the 
exception of conserved species, those persons would be exempt from the 
Act’s restrictions who are “entirely dependent . . . on hunting and 
gathering veld produce . . . where the animal is hunted for the reasonable 
food requirements of the hunter or of the members of the community to 
which he belongs.”244 Regulations applicable to specific tribal areas were 
also adopted that were generally drafted through close consultation with 
tribal leaders.245 There is no indication, however, that a similarly 
participatory approach was used with San groups. The tribal regulations 
 237. Opinion in Re: Common-Leases of Tribal Land, Ministry of Local Government and Lands 
File 2/1/1, reprinted in HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 32.  
 238. HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 32. 
 239. See id. at 33. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Hitchcock, in KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14, at 310. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Fauna Conservation (Amendment) Act No. 47 of 1967. 
 244. Id. § 4(3). 
 245. See, e.g., discussion in SPINAGE, supra note 89, at 21. 
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tended not to make any exceptions for subsistence hunters, and so even 
those customary rights retained by San who resided in tribal reserve areas 
were curbed. The government made key changes to hunting regulation in 
the CKGR and elsewhere in 1979.246 The 1979 legislation authorized 
regulations permitting “the hunting on State Land of an animal, other than 
a conserved animal, by a person belonging to a community which is 
entirely dependent for its living on hunting and gathering veld produce.”247 
The original Fauna Conservation Proclamation and subsequent 
regulations, it may be recalled, provided an exception for subsistence 
hunters, allowing subsistence hunters to obtain the “reasonable food 
requirements” for their bands without obtaining any license, for those 
species not listed in a schedule of conserved species.248 The 1979 Fauna 
Conservation Amendment, however, without consulting the relevant 
populations, imposed a new requirement on such subsistence hunters to 
obtain a Special Game License (“SGL”) as described in the Unified 
Hunting Regulations.249  
The government issued the more restrictive regulations out of concern 
for dwindling numbers of wildlife in the Kalahari, but aimed to enable 
poor rural groups, and specifically Remote Area Dwellers, who were 
dependent on wild game to continue to hunt.250 The Unified Hunting 
Regulations instituted a single regulatory regime for all of Botswana, 
eliminating the discrete systems for tribal reserves. The Regulations 
required Remote Area Dwellers who hunt scheduled species, including 
San residents of the CKGR, to obtain SGLs. The Regulations limited the 
issuance of the licenses to people defined as “nomadic” and who use 
traditional hunting weapons such as bows, arrows, spears, and snares and 
not “hunting aids”, such as horses or dogs. Hitchcock observes that, in 
practice, game officials “chose to give people SGLs . . . if they were not 
wearing pants and instead wore a breech cloth made of skin.”251 The SGLs 
were available without a fee and were valid year-round. Many rural groups 
who depended on hunting viewed the SGLs as crucial to survival. Their 
popularity grew during the 1980s, and by the mid-1990s more than two 
thousand SGLs were being granted each year.252 The government 
 246. See generally Fauna Conservation (Amendment) Act. No. 1 and Unified Hunting 
Regulations, Laws of Botswana Ch. 38:01. 
 247. Fauna Conservation (Amendment) Act No. 1, at § 4(b); Laws of Botswana Ch. 38:01, § 4(3). 
 248. Id. 
 249. See also Bishop, supra note 60, at 116. 
 250. See Hitchcock, supra note 23; Fauna Conservation (Unified Hunting) Regulations, 1979.  
 251. HITCHCOCK, KHOISAN IDENTITIES, supra note 14. 
 252. Hitchcock, supra note 23. 
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eventually viewed the increase in licenses as unsustainable, and in the late 
1990s it curtailed their issuance.253 
D. San Social and Development Policy: the Remote Area Development 
Programme 
A special development program initially designed for the San and then 
for other poor rural groups was initiated by the Ministry of Local 
Government and Lands in 1974.254 The Bushman Development 
Programme (BDP) was incorporated as a project in the Fourth National 
Development Plan and called for promotion of economic opportunity, 
provision of infrastructure, and human resource development. Several 
guiding principles for the BDP were identified, including the promotion of 
the San’s rights as citizens of Botswana, consultation with and 
participation by local groups for development projects and responsiveness 
to local conditions, integration of San into Botswana’s larger society and 
economy (contingent on the former’s agreement), and enhancement of San 
self reliance.255 Under the BDP, or as it later became known, the Remote 
Area Development Programme,256 the Ghanzi District Council set aside 
land for the San residing and working in the Ghanzi Farms. A survey of 
the area was conducted by a liaison between the BDP and the District 
Council, which indicated that 4,512 San lived in the area. Childers 
recommended that four settlement areas be established. In 1977 the 
Bushman Development Officer submitted a project proposal to the 
government, which in turn allocated blocks of land for the settlements at 
just 400 kilometers apiece.257 Problems for the San included the 
government’s reluctance to allow residents to fence their areas (thus to 
protect their land against outside cattle herders) and insufficient water 
supplies exacerbated by diversion to livestock. Nonetheless, the number of 
settlements established under the RADP increased to over sixty, with a 
population of thousands.258 
 253. Id. 
 254. The RADP also received major support from outside sources, such as the Norwegian 
Development Organization.  
 255. Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies, supra note 24. 
 256. The change in appellation of the Bushman Development Program to the Remote Area 
Development Program reflected the government’s desire to avoid ethnic identification and associations 
with apartheid; instead, it classified those covered by the program as “Remote Area Dwellers.” 
Nonetheless, the fact remained that 70–80% of Remote Area Dwellers were San. SAUGESTAD, supra 
note 21, at 127.  
 257. Hitchcock, Seeking Sustainable Strategies, supra note 24. 
 258. See HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 16. 
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The proliferation of settlements was part of a shift in the RADP from 
economic development and local institution-building to resettlement and 
infrastructure creation. Hitchcock relates a statement made at the second 
RADP workshop in 1979: 
The Remote Area Development Program (RADP) is an integrated 
rural development program which aims at bettering the general 
living standard of the poverty stricken communities by providing 
them with relevant education, health facilities, and healthy water 
supplies; over and above that by helping them to settle in one place 
so that they can be supplied with social services.259 
This policy statement foreshadowed much later justifications made by 
the government for removing residents from the CKGR and placing them 
in government-created settlements. As part of the RADP, the government 
assured residents of the CKGR that they would receive land, water, social 
services, and economic development assistance only if they left the 
CKGR.260 The strategy to resettle the San in government villages reflected 
the government’s definition of the “beneficiaries” of the initial program, as 
“people living outside of village settlements.”261  
The arrival of Botswana’s independence brought sovereignty for the 
nation and democracy for most of its inhabitants, but the government’s 
exercise in nation-building failed to address, among other San concerns, 
those pertaining to land, hunting, and development. The bureaucratic, top-
down, and ethnicity-blind approach taken by the government had 
damaging implications for it denied San the benefits of Botswana’s 
transformation while burdening them with many of its costs.  
VII. RIGHTS-BASED DEVELOPMENT AND ABORIGINAL TITLE IN 
BOTSWANA 
San groups have become increasingly organized and assertive at local, 
national, and international levels,262 and San mobilization has flourished in 
Botswana and more broadly in southern Africa since the early 1990s. To 
be sure, San groups in Botswana had previously advocated for land rights, 
better working conditions on ranches and farms, and other issues, 
particularly with the adoption of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy. A key 
 259. See HITCHCOCK, KALAHARI COMMUNITIES, supra note 14, at 34.  
 260. Bishop, supra note 60, at 114–15. 
 261. SAUGESTAD, supra note 21, at 133. 
 262. See generally id. at 196–208. 
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step, however, was taken at a regional conference on development 
programs for San held in Windhoek, Namibia, in 1992. At this Conference 
San representatives voiced support for the formation of committees at 
local, regional, and international levels as well as a regional network. 
Some of the most important actors in the struggle for San groups have 
been First People of the Kalahari, the Kuru Development Trust, the 
Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA), 
and the South African San Institute. In terms of substantive issues, four 
sets of concerns in particular have been stressed by San NGOs: 
subsistence hunting rights; land rights; rights to benefits from tourism and 
wildlife-related conservation and development projects; and cultural and 
language rights.263 These organizations’ emphasis on rights is striking in 
contrast to the government’s focus on assimilation, and provides further 
support for rights-based and participatory approaches to development 
policy instead of the bureaucratic, top-down method that dominates many 
countries, including Botswana. I will now briefly discuss applicable 
human right norms, focusing on the two most important instruments to 
which Botswana is a party, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). I will then set forth an extended defense for the viability 
of San groups’ aboriginal title claims in Botswana. 
A. International Human Rights Norms 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People recently delivered critical 
reports on the government’s treatment of the San. The August 2002 CERD 
report was particularly detailed in its assessment and recommendations. 
The Committee expressed concern about, among other things, the 
“expressions of prejudice against the Basarwa/San people, including 
public officials,” the poverty of marginalized ethnic groups, and the 
“ongoing dispossession” of the Basarwa/San from their lands. The 
Committee also expressed concern about reports stating that the 
resettlement of the San outside of the CKGR “does not respect their 
political, economic, social and cultural rights,” or the San’s linguistic and 
cultural rights.264 The Committee thus recommended that “no decisions 
 263. IWGIA Report, supra note 29, at 277. 
 264. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations, 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. CERD/C/61/CO/2. 
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directly relating to the rights and interests of members of indigenous 
peoples be taken without their informed consent.”265 Furthermore, the 
Committee advocated that negotiations be resumed with San and NGOs on 
this matter and that a rights-based approach to development be adopted, 
and266 that Botswana “fully recognize and respect the culture, history, 
languages and way of life of its various ethnic groups . . . and adopt 
measures to protect and support minority languages.”267 In addition, the 
Special Rapporteur, as noted earlier, expressed concern over the 
“dispossession” of San from their “traditional lands to make way for game 
reserves and national parks.”268 What effect these pronouncements will 
have on the government’s conduct remains uncertain, but they provide a 
standard by which such conduct must be assessed.  
In September 2000 Botswana ratified the ICCPR.269 While its initial 
report was due in December of 2001, it has still not been submitted to the 
Human Rights Committee.270 Botswana has not, however, ratified the 
ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, which enables individuals of the ratifying 
country to bring “communications” before the Committee. Nonetheless, 
once the government submits its report, the Human Rights Committee is 
likely to address San issues, particularly in view of its recent prominence 
and emergence in the CERD and Special Rapporteur reports.271 
Substantively, there are problems with Botswana’s treatment of the San 
under the ICCPR’s protections for national minorities. Article 27 provides 
that:  
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Economic and Social Council, Indigenous Issues, Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., 
Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/97/Add. 1. 
 269. See Botswana—Treaties: Ratifications and Reservations, at http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord 
2002/vol2/botswanarr.htm (last visited June 10, 2004). Unfortunately, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not been ratified. 
 270. Article 40 of the ICCPR requires states to “submit reports on the measures they have adopted 
which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those 
rights.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. 
Doc.A/6316 (1996). Reports must “indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the 
implementation of the present Covenant.” Id. The Committee then is to “study” the report and transmit 
its “general comments” to the party. Id. See generally HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 710 (2000).  
 271. In the 1990s the Human Rights Committee reformed its method to enable greater 
participation by other parts of the UN. Id. at 711, 713 (reproducing, in part, Thomas Buergenthal, The 
Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Ch.10 (Philip Alston ed., 
2000)). 
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In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language.272 
An individual’s right to enjoy the culture of her group is construed in 
broad terms and, particularly where the group is an indigenous minority, 
may include the group’s relationship to territory and usage of natural 
resources. In particular, Comment 3.2 to the ICCPR elaborates that:  
The enjoyment of the rights to which article 27 relates does not 
prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State party. At 
the same time one or other aspect of the rights of individuals 
protected under that article—for example to enjoy a particular 
culture—may consist in a way of life which is closely associated 
with territory and use of its resources. This may be particularly true 
of indigenous communities constituting a minority.273 
Moreover, some restrictions on hunting and other resource rights 
constitute violations of article 27 and the right to practice one’s culture. 
These views have been expressed by the Committee regarding 
communications under the Optional Protocol. For example, in Kitok v. 
Sweden, the Committee stressed that:  
[W]ith regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under 
article 27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in 
many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the 
use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. 
That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or 
hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law.274 
The Committee also emphasized that “the enjoyment of these rights may 
require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the 
effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions 
which affect them.”275  
 272. International Covenant on Civil Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 99 U.N.T.S. 171, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966) art. 27 [hereinafter “ICCPR”]. 
 273. ICCPR, supra note 272, cmt. 3.2. 
 274. Commission on Civil and Political Rights, The Rights of Minorities, Commission for Human 
Rights, 50th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/43/40, Annex VII (1994) (citing Kitok v. Sweden, Commication No. 
197/1985 (1988)) [hereinafter The Rights of Minorities]. Human Rights Committee, Mahuika et al. v. 
New Zealand, Comm. No. 547/1993, 27 October 2000. UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993. 
 275. Id. 
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The Committee’s emphasis on participation is especially apt in this 
context given the notable failure of Botswana’s government to incorporate 
community positions into the regulatory decisions that have been imposed 
on San groups. This failure is particularly important given the 
Committee’s view in the Mahuika opinion that the acceptability of 
measures that interfere “with the culturally significant economic activities 
of a minority” turns on “whether the members of the minority in question 
have had the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process” 
and “whether they will continue to benefit from their traditional 
economy.”276 Opportunities to participate in decisionmaking and rights to 
continued benefits from traditional activities have rarely been granted to 
the San.277 Finally, the Committee has recognized under article 27 “the 
right of persons, in community with others, to engage in economic and 
social activities which are part of the culture of the community to which 
they belong,”278 and subsequently has elaborated that article 27 not only 
protects traditional means of livelihood but also allows for the adaptation 
of such means to “the modern way of life and ensuing technology.”279 This 
provision contravenes the restrictions imposed on San hunters regarding 
the use of modern weapons and methods. 
B. Land Rights: Is An Aboriginal Title Claim Viable?  
San groups have recently advocated vigorously for their land rights. In 
June 1997, First People of the Kalahari (First People) organized a 
workshop of CKGR community representatives leading to the 
establishment of a negotiating team that, among other goals, would seek 
the transfer of ownership rights in the CKGR to residents.280 The 
government initially did not respond to requests for negotiations and, 
instead, cut off services to the CKGR in January 2002, causing the 
negotiating team to launch a legal challenge that is currently pending in 
 276. Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, supra note 274. 
 277. The regulations themselves give little recognition for traditional hunting and gathering 
activities. San NGOs and others attest to the lack of consideration given San groups in the drafting of 
legislation and regulatory provisions.  
 278. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, VLEWSON, Communication No. 167/1984, Ominayak v. 
Canada, para 32.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990). 
 279. Mahuika, supra note 276, at 5. 
 280. The negotiating team consisted of representatives from villages in the CKGR, a delegate 
from First People, the Kuru Development Trust, and WIMSA. SASI also contributed to the legal team. 
See Kxao Moses #Oma, Indigenous Self-Organisation in Southern Africa and the Experience of 
WIMSA, in 20/21 INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS 10 (1999). 
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Botswana’s High Court.281 One strategy that may bolster San land claims 
or buttress the bargaining position with the government is the 
consideration of aboriginal title.  
Neither Botswana’s constitution nor its legislation expressly provides 
for aboriginal title claims, and Botswana’s courts have not yet recognized 
such claims. A critical issue is how to demonstrate the applicability of the 
doctrine of aboriginal title as a matter of municipal law. Doing so would 
not be an easy task for several reasons. First, aboriginal title has 
principally been developed under Anglo-American common law and 
against the background of British colonial jurisprudence, not under the 
Roman-Dutch legal heritage of southern Africa. Second, the doctrine has 
mainly emerged in regard to former settled colonies rather than 
protectorates. Third, indigenous claims in other countries have often been 
buttressed by treaties or legislation, whereas in Botswana agreements were 
concluded only with certain Tswana leaders while the San were not 
accorded political recognition.282  
One strategy to combat these problems is to argue that the doctrine of 
aboriginal title is a principle of customary international law, and as such is 
applicable as Botswana’s municipal law. In determining whether a 
principle is one of customary international law, two elements are 
considered. First, one must consider whether there has been sufficient 
constancy and uniformity of practice consistent with the principle. Second, 
one must consider whether the practice has been accompanied by a sense 
that it is obligatory.283 A wide array of materials may be considered in 
identifying a principle of customary international law, such as treaties, 
Security Council resolutions, General Assembly resolutions and 
declarations,284 judicial decisions,285 “teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations,”286 and legislation. Numerous 
 281. WIMSA has taken part in negotiations in South Africa over land restitution in the Kalahari 
Gemsboek National Park, and in Namibia regarding the Khwe land dispute with the government over 
West Caprivi. #Oma, supra note 280, at 21. 
 282. On the other hand, even if it turns out to be right that “the doctrine would be useful to the 
Basarwa cause only to the extent that the State would be compelled to take full cognizance of Basarwa 
rights in its management of national parks, game reserves, and other resources on State land,” 
Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 25–26, this would seem to make aboriginal title more than “moot,” as 
traditionally many San have lived on state lands, including in particular the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve. Id. at 25. 
 283. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 667 (1900). See also Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, art. 38(2) [hereinafter P.C.I.J. Statute]. 
 284. See, e.g., Nicaragua v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14; Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (advisory 
opinion). 
 285. P.C.I.J. Statute, supra note 283, art. 38(4). 
 286. Id. 
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countries have either explicitly or implicitly recognized the doctrine of 
aboriginal title. Countries have recognized indigenous land rights in their 
constitutions,287 through treaty,288 and by local legislation. Support for 
aboriginal title can also be found in international treaties and 
declarations,289 and the declaration and program of action from the 1993 
UN World Conference on Human Rights.290 Judicial decisions in 
Australia, Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, and the United States (among 
other countries) have recognized the doctrine of aboriginal title or 
indigenous land rights more generally. In addition, the International Court 
of Justice in the Western Sahara case declared that when a people 
inhabiting a territory have “a social and political organization,” the 
territory cannot be regarded as terra nullius.291 This criterion has been 
interpreted in broad terms and from the perspective of aboriginal groups 
rather than Western conceptions.  
Once aboriginal title has been recognized as a doctrine of customary 
international law, the second step is to consider whether customary 
international law is part of Botswana’s municipal law. The colonial era did 
not see a formal position taken on customary international law’s 
application to domestic law in proclamations or decisions, and the current 
constitution does not specifically incorporate international law into 
domestic law. Because the Bechuanaland Protectorate lacked external 
sovereignty, and the rule of British colonial law under the 1931 Statute of 
Westminster was that colonial territories were treated as part of Britain, it 
would appear that customary international law was the law of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate.292 In 1891 the law of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate was declared to be that of the Cape Colony,293 which in turn 
was, as some call it, Roman-Dutch common law (a mix of Roman-Dutch 
law and English common law).294 A number of scholars agree that these 
 287. Examples include those of Canada, Colombia, Brazil, Panama, Guatemala, Peru and the 
Philippines. T.W. Bennett & C.H. Powell, Aboriginal Title in South Africa Revisited, 15 S. AFR. J. 
HUM. RTS. 449, 453 (1999). 
 288. These include the United States and Norway. Id. 
 289. See, e.g., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
International Labour Organization, Convention No. 169, June 27, 1989 72 ILO Off. Bull. 59 (entered 
into force Sept. 5, 1991). 
 290. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993). 
 291. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 39. 
 292. TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 43. 
 293. Proc. of June 10, 1891, supra note 122, at 34. 
 294. TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 41–43, noting that, regarding the 1891 proclamation, “the 
dominant view is that this clause introduced the Roman-Dutch Law instead of the English common 
law into the territory. But, at the same time, as in Namibia and Zimbabwe, the said Roman-Dutch law 
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elements of Roman-Dutch common law were not automatically 
superseded at independence,295 but rather “continue[] to operate alongside 
the general law of Botswana found in statutes, subordinate legislation and 
judicial decisions.”296 As Chief Justice Hayfron-Benjamin stated in a 1979 
decision, “the common law of Botswana is the Roman-Dutch law of the 
Cape Colony.”297 
The rule of Roman-Dutch and English common law, however, is that 
customary international principles are laws of the land;298 hence courts are 
required to apply customary principles unless there is a legislative 
provision to the contrary, or application is prohibited by state doctrine or 
stare decisis.299 Although there have been few instances in which courts of 
Botswana have engaged the issue of whether customary international law 
is part of municipal law, they have borrowed international norms on some 
occasions300 and borrowed from the law of the Australia, Canada, Great 
Britain, South Africa, and the United States in many instances.301 
was greatly influenced by English common law principles and concepts,” particularly through the 
High Commissioner of South Africa’s legislation that introduced elements of English common law. Id. 
at 41. Moreover, the law of the Cape Colony itself involved both Dutch and English common law 
elements, insofar as the Cape was alternately controlled by the Dutch and British in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries. Id. at 21. 
 295. See Pain, supra note 115. See also TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 64. 
 296. TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 64. 
 297. Civil Appeal 14 of 1978 (Sept. 28, 1979) (unreported), cited in A.J.G.M. Sanders, 
Constitutionalism in Botswana: A Valiant Attempt at Judicial Activism, Part I, 16 COMP. & INT’L L.J. 
S. AFR.350, 364 n.13 (1983). 
 298. John Dugard, International Law is Part of Our Law, 88 S. AFR. L.J. 13 (1971); IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1990). See also observation by 
Blackstone: “the law of nations, whenever any question arises which is properly the object of its 
jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be part of the law of 
land.” Quoted in TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 66–67. 
 299. TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 44, 68 (discussing Agnes Bojan v. The State, Miscellaneous Case 
No. 6/1993 (HC) (unreported)). 
 300. The Attorney General of the Republic of Botswana v. Unity Dow, CA No. 4/91 (1992), 
reprinted in THE CITIZENSHIP CASE (Unity Dow ed., 1994). The case Att’y Gen. of Bots. v. Unity Dow 
involved a woman who married a U.S. citizen. She gave birth to two children who, under the 1984 
Citizenship Act, were denied Botswanan citizenship because their father was not a citizen of Botswana 
and they were not born out of wedlock to a Batswana mother. Id. at 30. Dow claimed that the Act 
discriminated against female citizens of Botswana married to foreigners. The High Court concluded 
that the Act violated the Constitution’s prohibitions of discrimination. While the presiding judge 
qualified his opinion by stating that mere signature of a treaty does not give it force of law in 
Botswana, he cited the 1967 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women of 1967, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Id. at 30, 39, 41. 
 301. See, e.g., Mochele Pheto v. The State, Criminal Appeal 170 of 1977 (applying judicial 
practice of South Africa); Moagi v. State, Criminal Appeal 73 of 1978 (citing with approval Griffin v. 
California’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment as precluding comment by prosecution or 
directions by trial court when such silence could be evidence of guilt); Modukwe v. State, Review 
Case 117 of 1980 (unreported). These cases are discussed in Sanders, Constitutionalism in Botswana, 
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One might also leave customary international law to the side, and argue 
more directly for the use of aboriginal title because of its specific 
recognition in Roman-Dutch common law. Although aboriginal title, 
strictly speaking, has not yet been recognized as a common law doctrine in 
the Roman-Dutch legal tradition of South Africa, it not been rejected 
either, and it has been recognized as a customary principle falling within 
the rubric of the nation’s Restitution Act.302 The strongest basis, however, 
is rooted in the common law element of Roman-Dutch common law. The 
principle that indigenous customary rights preexisted and, under certain 
conditions, survived colonial acquisitions of sovereignty has been 
recognized as either a common law or sui generis legal norm by courts in 
a number of legal systems derived from the Anglo-American tradition 
including Australia,303 Canada,304 Malaysia,305 New Zealand,306 and the 
supra note 297, at 361–70. An argument for the recognition of aboriginal title is also strengthened by 
the principle of liberal construction employed in interpreting constitutional provisions in Botswana. 
TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 62. 
 302. As previously noted, the Bechuanaland Protectorate received the law of the Cape Colony in 
June 1891. It continued through the independence of the Republic of Botswana in 1966. Proc. No. 35 
(Dec. 8, 1909), in BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE 1891–1914, supra note 105, at 225–26. As Pain 
puts it, a “timeless reception” of Roman-Dutch common law was effected.” Pain, supra note 115, at 
164. It is unknown whether South Africa will recognize a common law or other basis for aboriginal 
title. No decision has directly considered common law aboriginal title, but the 2001 Richtersveld 
decision considered claims by aboriginal groups, including the San, who were forced from the 
Richtersveld area in the northwestern Cape region after diamonds were discovered in 1925. 
Richtersveld Community v. Alexkor Ltd., LCC 151/98 (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2001). 
The groups brought their claim to the Land Claims Court for restitution on a theory of aboriginal title. 
They argued that they had customary title that was not extinguished prior to 1913 and was, therefore, 
within the ambit of the Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994. Restitution of Land Rights Act No. 22 
of 1994. See also T.H. Bennett, supra note 287, at 450. To be eligible under the Act for the return of 
their lands or restitution, claimants must have lost their land after June 19, 1913. This reflected the 
Act’s primary purpose of rectifying the injustices of apartheid. The 1913 date was chosen since during 
that year the first ‘pillar of apartheid,’ the Natives Land Act, No. 27 of 1913, was enacted. The Land 
Claims Court ultimately denied the claim on grounds that the statutory threshold of racial 
discrimination had not been met. The Court explicitly left open the possibility for a common law 
aboriginal title claim, although it did not directly address it because its jurisdiction was limited to 
claims under the Restitution Act. See Richtersveld, supra, at para. 47 n.102. Last year, however, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and set aside the judgment of the Land Claims 
Court. Richtersveld Community v. vs. Alexkor Ltd., 6 BCLR 583 (South African Supreme Court of 
Appeal (2003)). Alexkor was permitted to appeal to the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Alexkor 
Ltd. v. Richtersveld Community, CCT19/03, (2003). The Constitutional Court found in favor of the 
Richtersveld community, ruling that it had land rights preexisting Britain’s annexation in 1847 and that 
the community was dispossessed through racially discriminatory laws or practices. Id. While the Court 
declined to consider whether a common law concept of aboriginal title exists in South Africa, it did 
recognize it as a customary principle falling within the scope of the Restitution Act. There is a good 
chance that the Court would have followed the path of other jurisdictions in elaborating a common law 
conception had there not been legislative support.  
 303. See, e.g., Yarmir v. N. Territory, 156 A.L.R. 370 (Federal Court of Australia 1998); Mabo v. 
Queensland, 107 A.L.R. 1 (High Court of Australia 1992). As summarized in Ward v. W. Austl.,  
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United States.307 The doctrine of aboriginal title has also has been 
recognized in decisions of the Imperial Privy Council regarding Southern 
Rhodesia and Nigeria.308 In this light, one can conclude that “English 
common law has long accepted the principle that the right to follow 
customary activities and practices by the prior occupants of a settled 
colony survived the assumption of sovereignty by Britain.”309  
As a customary principle based on the prior occupation of indigenous 
groups, aboriginal title is rooted in possession. Hence, it is structurally 
similar in certain respects to a common law property right. It is 
nonetheless distinct and sui generis because it took form prior to the 
assertion of British sovereignty.310 It was thus “wholly wrong,” as Justice 
Hall declared in the Calder decision, to conclude that “after conquest or 
discovery the appellant’s predecessors have no rights at all except those 
subsequently granted or recognized by the conqueror or discoverer.”311 
Instead, courts have required that the sovereign demonstrate some further 
Native, or aboriginal, title is a concept of the common law. It is the means by which the 
common law recognises [sic] rights enjoyed by indigenous inhabitants of land by reason of 
their occupation of that land and reconciles the rights of those inhabitants with rights obtained 
by the Crown upon claiming sovereignty over the land.  
Ward v. W. Austl., 159 A.L.R. 483, 497 (Federal Court of Australia 1998). 
 304. See, e.g., Delgamuukw v. B.C. [1997] 153 D.L.R. 4d 193; R. v. Van Der Peet, [1996] 137 
D.L.R. 4d 289; Calder v. Att’y Gen. of B.C. [1973] 34 D.L.R. 3d 145. Constitutional rights form a key 
part of the later jurisprudence, based on § 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, and courts 
distinguish between title and rights. See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra. Nonetheless, the court in 
Delgamuukw stressed that the common law right preceded, and is protected by § 35(1): “[a]boriginal 
title is a sui generis trust arising from the occupation of Canada before the assertion of British 
sovereignty. The existence of an aboriginal right at common law is sufficient, but not necessary, for 
the recognition and affirmation of that right by § 35(1).” Id. at 195. 
 305. See, e.g., Adong Bin Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor, 1997(1) M.L.J. 418 
(High Court (Johor Bahru)). 
 306. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Tauranga Dist. Council 1996(1) N.Z.L.R. 357; Te Weehi v. Reg’l 
Fisheries Officer 1986(1) N.Z.L.R. 680; R. v. Symonds, 1847 N.Z.P.C.C. 387.  
 307. See, e.g., Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 530 
(1832); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  
 308. In re Southern Rhodesia, 1918 AC 211 (P.C.); Amodu Tijani v. Sec’y, S. Nigeria, 1921 (2) 
AC 399 (P.C.) (noting that the original communal right is presumed to continue to exist unless the 
contrary is established by the context or circumstances). Although these doctrines have been modified 
or superseded in various ways, their recognition of the doctrine of aboriginal title has not been 
modified. 
 309. Such “rights to customary activities and practices” are construed expansively, as they refer to 
a “continuum of rights” extending from activities relating to personal relationships (such as marriage 
and divorce), to hunting, fishing and other food gathering practices linked to land and waters, and to 
possession of land constituting “customary title.” Rt. Hon. Sir Douglas Graham, The Legal Reality of 
Customary Rights, pub. by New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit (2001) 4, 6. 
 310. See, e.g., Delgamuukw, 153 D.L.R. 4d at 242; see also Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
322, 340 (holding unanimously that aboriginal title predated British colonization and claims of 
sovereignty). 
 311. Calder v. Att’y Gen. of B.C., [1973] 34 D.L.R. 3d 145, at 146. 
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act of extinguishment. As stated in Western Australia v. Commonwealth, 
“[a]t common law, a mere change in sovereignty over a territory does not 
extinguish pre-existing rights and interests in land in that territory. 
Although an acquiring Sovereign can extinguish such rights and interests 
in the course of the act of State acquiring the territory, the presumption in 
the case of the Crown is that no extinguishment is intended.”312 “In short,” 
as the court in Ward v. Western Australia concluded, “indigenous 
inhabitants who had rights in land as the occupiers thereof did not become 
trespassers on that land by the establishment of a colony and assertion of 
sovereignty by the Crown.”313 A viable doctrine of aboriginal title exists 
that has been recognized as part of, yet distinct from, the English 
common-law tradition.314  
If, by virtue of customary international law, Roman-Dutch common 
law, constitutional common law, or some combination thereof, aboriginal 
title is properly part of Botswana’s municipal common law, the next 
question would be whether it applies in the case of the San groups. There 
is no simple test for evaluating aboriginal title claims, and methods have 
varied across time and jurisdiction. Assessments usually involve inquiry 
into the following criteria: whether the relevant indigenous group occupied 
the claimed lands at the time of colonization; whether the occupation was 
of sufficient continuity and duration; whether the claimant group is 
“aboriginal,” existing as a distinct cultural group over time, and living 
according to a set of laws or quasi-legal social norms (especially ones 
regulating land use); and finally, and often most important, whether 
aboriginal title has been extinguished by subsequent exercises of legal 
 312. W. Austl. v. Commonwealth, (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373, at 422 (citations omitted). 
 313. Ward, 159 A.L.R. at 497. See also Symonds, 1847 N.Z.P.C.C., at 390–91; Amodu Tijani, 
1921(2) AC at 407. 
 314. Although one might object that the Roman-Dutch law inherited by Botswana does not 
embrace the doctrine of aboriginal title and hence no common law notion of aboriginal title should be 
recognized in Botswana, such an objection would be unpersuasive. First, as noted earlier, Botswana’s 
Roman-Dutch common law tradition incorporated much English common law by way of the High 
Commissioner of South Africa’s legislation. Also in the Cape Colony, Roman-Dutch law was not used 
exclusively, and in that sense whether it includes aboriginal title or not should not be dispositive. Note 
also Tshosa’s observation that Cape law was influenced by English law and that judges had an English 
common law background. TSHOSA, supra note 119, at 41–42. Second, even where British colonies 
have subsequently taken on a different legal system, courts have found the operation of aboriginal title. 
In particular, Canadian courts ruled that, notwithstanding the application of French law in Quebec, 
aboriginal title existed as a necessary element of British sovereignty. See R. v. Adams, [1996] 138 
D.L.R. 4d 657, at 32–33; R. v. Côté, [1996] 138 D.L.R. 4d 385, at 42. As Bennett observes, such 
decisions lend weight to the proposition that aboriginal doctrine in former British colonies should be 
construed not so much as an element of common law, but rather as one of constitutional common law. 
Bennett, supra note 287, at 462. One might persuasively treat aboriginal title as a constitutional 
common law principle for Botswana. 
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authority.315 If title has not been extinguished, it gives a right of 
occupation against all but the sovereign and is inalienable to anyone other 
than the state.316 
Addressing the question of prior occupation first, it is accepted that San 
groups inhabited what is now Botswana prior to the establishment of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885. The specific questions about whether 
particular San groups inhabited the corresponding territories to which they 
made claims would be more complicated. Such questions would require a 
fine-grained analysis of history and land use. This is not the place in which 
to pursue such questions closely, but some general points may be made 
regarding application of the law. First, there is no reason that what 
apparently was a primarily hunter-gatherer lifestyle should preclude any 
particular claim. The criterion for occupancy is not based on some 
Eurocentric requirement of agricultural production. The analysis in Ward 
is instructive as the court concluded that, notwithstanding the mobility of 
the aboriginal groups in seeking food and other resources and the 
inexactness of boundaries of the territories over which they ranged, “the 
ever-changing locale of a nomadic community will not be inconsistent 
with occupancy for the purpose of that element of native title.”317 
Although a “truly random presence on land, unconnected with the 
economic, cultural or religious life of the community” would not 
constitute occupancy, the latter is not to be understood as common law 
possession. Rather, it should be construed as “an acknowledged 
connection with the land arising out of traditional rights to be present on, 
and to use, the land.”318 It is therefore “necessary to look at [the] question 
from the standpoint of the indigenous community,” and to ask whether 
“the degree of presence on the land [is] consistent with the demands of the 
land and the needs of a community pursuing traditional practices, habits, 
customs and usages that form the way of life of that community.”319 There 
is no strict requirement of exclusivity, insofar as occupation “need not be 
exclusive to one community” but may in certain conditions be shared 
among several communities.320  
Canada takes a similarly broad approach to what constitutes occupancy 
by an aboriginal group. The leading case, Delgamuukw, required that 
 315. For a comparable framework, see e.g., Bennett, supra note 287, at 463–78. 
 316. See Ward, 159 A.L.R. at 510. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 510–11. 
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aboriginal groups show that they occupied the lands in question at the time 
of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. The court added that occupation 
must be evaluated in terms of both common law and aboriginal 
perspectives.321 The common law focus on physical occupation is to be 
interpreted broadly. Thus, it is not limited to construction of dwellings or 
enclosure of fields but may include “regular use of definite tracts of land 
for hunting, fishing or otherwise exploiting its resources.”322 Above all, the 
analysis is flexible and accommodating. “In considering whether 
occupation sufficient to ground title is established, the group’s size, 
manner of life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the 
character of the lands must be taken into account.”323 A group need not 
show that present and prior occupation of lands has been unbroken, but 
evidence of present occupation may be used as proof of pre-sovereignty 
occupation. Although “at sovereignty, occupation must be exclusive,” (a 
requirement interpreted liberally in Ward),324 it should also be noted that 
“shared, non-exclusive aboriginal title short of aboriginal title but tied to 
the land and permitting a number of uses can be established if exclusivity 
cannot be proved.”325  
A proper analysis of aboriginal title claims requires close evaluation on 
a case-by-case basis of the full context and details of occupation and land 
use. One can observe, however, that San groups are likely to be able to 
demonstrate occupancy in the sense articulated in Ward, Delgamuukw, and 
other leading decisions, for they occupied significant tracts of land at the 
time of the Protectorate’s establishment in what are now the districts of 
Kgalagadi, Ghanzi, Ngamiland, and the Central District (and possibly 
others). There has been substantial continuity of occupation for many of 
the groups in these areas. Moreover, it should be noted that the 
requirement of continuity is not construed strictly, but rather is satisfied by 
“substantial maintenance of the connection” between the land and the 
people.326 Regarding exclusivity, the San groups frequently have used 
customary rules defining areas of territory in an exclusive manner for 
hunting, foraging, residing, and other uses. The connection of San groups 
to their territories has not in any sense been “random”327 but rather has 
 321. See Delagmuukw, 153 D.L.R. 4d 193. 
 322. Id.  
 323. Id. 
 324. See, e.g., id. at 258–59; Ward, 159 A.L.R. 483. 
 325. Delgamuukw, 153 D.L.R. 4d 193. 
 326. See R. v. Van Der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 557; see also Delgamuukw, 153 D.L.R. 4d at 
257–58; Ward, 159 A.L.R. at 502; Bennett, supra note 287, at 467. 
 327. Ward, 159 A.L.R. 483. 
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emerged out of a complex interaction of social, ecological, and cultural 
variables. Many of the groups constituting the San are also likely to meet 
the threshold of being distinct cultural groups over time. While the 
collective identity of the San has recently been vociferously asserted in 
different fora, the identities of constituent groups stretch far into history.  
If a group claiming aboriginal title is able to meet the foregoing 
occupancy and other requirements, the next question is whether such title 
has been extinguished by subsequent acts of the Crown. Explaining why, 
and under what conditions, extinguishment occurs requires a brief 
discussion of the common law concept of radical title. Under English law, 
the Crown could extinguish aboriginal title because of its acquisition of 
sovereignty over the lands and hence possession of “radical title.”328 
Radical title is a concept adopted from feudal theory that was used in the 
colonial context and which relates to the doctrine of tenure. The doctrine 
of tenure was a legal fiction, stretching back to the Norman Conquest of 
1066, and postulating that the Crown owned all of the land in England, 
whether mediately or immediately, and that the King was viewed to be 
“Lord Paramount” of lands that were thus held by others in tenancy.329 It 
was assumed when the Crown acquired territory beyond England that the 
doctrine of tenure would operate.330 Hence, “the Crown was invested with 
the character of Paramount Lord in the colonies by attributing to the 
Crown a title . . . that was called a radical, ultimate or final title.”331  
Radical title enabled the Crown to acquire land in demesne (i.e., Crown 
land) and hence to become absolute beneficial owner, or to grant tenures 
over which it would be Paramount Lord.332 Colonial lands that were 
considered terra nullius were automatically acquired as Crown lands (the 
Crown became seised in demesne) under the feudal analogy whereby an 
occupant of a manor “by taking livery or occupying a manor acquired 
possession of the waste lands thereof.”333 By contrast, where the Crown 
 328. See discussion in Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 33. 
 329. Id., at 31–32. As Blackstone remarked: “it became a fundamental maxim, and necessary 
principle (though in reality a mere fiction) of our English tenures, that the king is the universal lord 
and original proprietor of all the lands in his kingdom; and that no man doth or can possess any part of 
it, but what has, mediately or immediately, been derived as a gift from him to be held upon feudal 
services.” See COMMENTARIES, Book II, 50 (1809). 
 330. See, e.g., MCNEIL, supra note 109, at 217. 
 331. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 33. 
 332. Id. 
 333. MCNEIL, supra note 109, at 135. Nonetheless, as Bennett notes, the presumption that 
aboriginal title is not extinguished absent an express provision has held true even for terra nullius in 
some cases, such as in Australia. Bennett, supra note 287, at 471. See, e.g., W. Austl., (1995) 183 
C.L.R. at 433. As a result, “titles were not necessarily extinguished on the assertion of sovereignty, 
even when a territory was placed at the disposal of the Crown for sale or grant to settlers.” Bennett, 
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gained sovereignty over lands through conquest or cession it did not 
automatically gain an absolute beneficial ownership. As stated in Mabo, 
“if the land were occupied by the indigenous inhabitants and their rights 
and interests in the land are recognized by the common law, the radical 
title which is acquired with the acquisition of sovereignty cannot itself be 
taken to confer an absolute beneficial title to the occupied land.”334 Such a 
rule was used, as the Mabo court notes, regarding the conquests of Ireland 
and Wales.335 Indigenous groups in some British dependencies thus came 
to be seen as holding usufructuary titles336 that burdened the Crown’s 
radical title.337 Although the Crown could extinguish the usufructuary title 
and obtain fee simple over the lands, doing so required some act beyond 
acquisition of sovereignty.338 
Hence an act of extinguishment by the Crown is viewed by courts as a 
precondition of the sacrifice of aboriginal title, and the colonial power is 
presumed not to have intended to abolish title by acquisition of 
sovereignty.339 At least since the New Zealand decision Te Weehi v. 
Regional Fisheries Officer courts have required that any act allegedly 
extinguishing aboriginal title manifest a “clear and plain intention” to do 
so.340 Such an intention, as elaborated by the court in Mabo, “is not 
revealed by a law that merely regulates the enjoyment of native title or 
creates a regime of control that is consistent with the continued enjoyment 
of native title.”341 For extinguishment to occur, a right must be created and 
exercised that is incompatible with the continued enjoyment of title.342 It is 
not enough that the sovereign act creates a right the exercise of which 
merely could be incompatible. For example, even if a reservation is made 
supra note 287, at 471. 
 334. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 34. 
 335. Id. (citing The Case of Tanistry, 80 ER 516 (1608); Witrong and Blany, 3 Keb 401, 402 
(1674)).  
 336. Usufructuary rights are actually derived from Roman civil law, and may be defined as “a 
right to use another’s property for a time without damaging or diminishing it. . . .” BLACK’S LAW 
DICT. 1543 (7th ed. 1999).  
 337. See Admin. of Papua and New Guinea v. Daera Guba, (1973) 130 C.L.R. 353, at 397; Amodu 
Tijani, 1921(2) AC at 403. 
 338. As Mabo finds, “it is only the fallacy of equating sovereignty and beneficial ownership of 
land that gives rise to the notion that native title is extinguished by the acquisition of sovereignty.” 
Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 35. 
 339. Bennett, supra note 287, at 470–71. 
 340. Te Weehi, 1986(1) N.Z.L.R. 680, at 691–92. See also Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 45. 
 341. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 46. 
 342. Id. On the other hand, courts have accepted the view that aboriginal title may under certain 
conditions be extinguished by “necessary implication,” the most common situation being where the 
sovereign grants tenure to a third party, allowing them to use the land in a way that is inconsistent with 
the exercise of rights implicit in aboriginal title. Bennett, supra note 287, at 473. 
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for a public purpose other than the benefit of indigenous groups, “a right 
to continued enjoyment of native title may be consistent with the specified 
purpose . . . and native title will not be extinguished.”343 Regulations that 
merely impair aboriginal rights do not extinguish the underlying title, even 
if there are several kinds of rights that are curtailed or eliminated, so long 
as those rights are not essential to the title.344 
An especially important question in Botswana is whether Britain’s 
1904 and 1910 acquisitions of Crown lands in demesne extinguished San 
title claims. Although the 1904 Order acquiring lands from the Ngwato, 
Bakwena, and Ngwaketsi, in view of the recognition of them as tribes with 
preexisting control of the land over which they “abandoned all rights and 
jurisdiction,” may have constituted a cession,345 the more important 
legislation for the San was the sweeping 1910 Orders in Council. It vested 
in the South African High Commissioner the remaining territory of 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, other than the land set aside for tribal reserves 
and other specific exceptions.346 One might argue that prior to the 1910 
Order the San held usufructuary rights over their lands.347 Usufructuary 
rights presuppose that the Crown holds the radical title, or, in more archaic 
terms, that it is Paramount Lord. There is nothing to indicate the Crown 
held radical title before it was found to have complete jurisdiction, 
however, over lands primarily inhabited by the San. The sovereignty it 
held was only external, and so, as a matter of international law, Britain 
would not have held title and, perhaps as a matter of English law as well. 
To be sure, “[O]nce the Crown has asserted its sovereignty over an area, or 
engaged in activity tantamount to its assertion, that territory will be treated 
as British for municipal purposes,” regardless of international criteria.348 
What is less clear is why radical title would have preceded the court’s 
recognition of Britain’s unlimited jurisdiction, which is what the concept 
of “usufructuary rights” prior to 1910 suggests. One might further question 
whether the “power and jurisdiction” over all inhabitants by the Sekgome 
court’s interpretation of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act349 encompassed the 
transfer of such title to the Crown. Bishop points out that one could claim 
that the British annexation of Crown lands was an act of state, the 
argument being that “once the British Crown acquired authority over the 
 343. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 50. 
 344. Ward, 159 A.L.R. 483. 
 345. See also Bishop, supra note 60, at 106. See generally MCNEIL, supra note 109, at 117. 
 346. Orders in Council (Jan. 10, 1910); see discussion supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 347. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 60, at 108. 
 348. McHugh, supra note 108, at 85. 
 349. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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lands of the Protectorate,” . . . “annexation of Bechuanaland Protectorate 
territory fell squarely within a valid exercise of the British Crown’s royal 
prerogative and within its unlimited jurisdiction over external affairs.”350 
This argument could be correct, insofar as one could claim that the 
Sekgome decision confirmed Britain’s sovereignty over the Protectorate, 
and accordingly, by an act of state, not capable of challenge by municipal 
courts, Britain annexed the lands as described in the 1910 Order.351  
It is necessary to distinguish two New Zealand decisions that at first 
seem to suggest a different conclusion. One decision is the Te Teira Paea 
v. Te Roera Tareha case before the Privy Council.352 The case emerged in 
the context of an agreement between the New Zealand government and 
certain Maori groups which provided that a certain parcel of land, 
controlled by the government by virtue of an 1867 proclamation issued 
after the New Zealand Settlement Act of 1863, be allotted to a Maori chief 
and held in trust by him for specified beneficiaries. Other Maori groups 
brought a suit, claiming that they were the proper beneficiaries by 
aboriginal custom and usage that gave them an entitlement overriding the 
interests of those specified in the agreement. The court addressed the issue 
of whether customary title had been extinguished, and accordingly turned 
to the Settlement Act and the subsequent proclamation. The Act:  
empowered the Governor in Council to declare any district in which 
lands of rebellious natives or tribes were situate to be a ‘district’ 
within the provisions of the Act, and to take out such district lands 
for settlement and colonization, and these lands were to be Crown 
lands. Loyal natives having any interest in the lands thus taken were 
to be compensated . . . [or] trusts might be declared either of the 
money or of the land given in compensation.353 
Under the Act’s authority, in 1867 the Governor stated by proclamation 
that certain lands would be a “district” under the Act. The Governor 
further declared that such lands would be “reserved and taken for the 
purposes of settlements,” and that “‘no land of any loyal inhabitant within 
the said district will be retained by the government, and further, that all 
rebel inhabitants of the said district who come in within a reasonable time 
and make submission to the Queen will receive a sufficient quantity of 
 350. Bishop, supra note 60, at 107. 
 351. See June 1910 Order in Council, supra note 120. See also MCNEIL, supra note 109, at 162 
(“The Crown has prerogative power to acquire new territory by act of state”). 
 352. Te Teira Paea v. Te Roeia Tareha, [1902] AC 56.  
 353. Id. at 61. 
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land within the district for their maintenance.’”354 Reviewing the 
proclamation, the Privy Council ruled that all of the lands within the 
district ceased to be “native lands” under the Native Land Act. They also 
found that all aboriginal titles were extinguished, with such titles in the 
future depending entirely on government grants.355  
A second, more recent case involving the same 1863 Settlements Act 
also concluded that aboriginal title was extinguished.356 A subsequent 
Order in Council declared that specific lands henceforth constituted a 
“district” within the Act, and that “the same are hereby set apart and 
reserved as sites for settlements and colonization . . . [and] three-fourths in 
quantity of the said lands shall be set apart for such persons of the tribe 
Ngaiterangi as shall be determined by the Governor.”357 The Parliament 
then enacted the Tauranga District Lands Act of 1867, which validated 
grants and contracts concerning the lands made pursuant to the Order. The 
Act also declared that the lands specified in the Order were: 
duly and effectually declared to be a District within the provisions 
of [the 1863 Act] and that the whole of the said land was duly and 
effectually set apart reserved and taken under the said Act as sites 
for settlements for colonization and was duly and effectually 
declared to be required for the purposes of the said Act and to be 
subject to the provisions thereof.358 
Under the Maori Affairs Act, the land was vested in trustees in 1972 
with the order describing the land as “Maori freehold land.” A certificate 
of title was issued in 1986 in the name of the current trustees.359 The 
question then arose whether Maori title survived the legislation and the 
trust. Unlike the 1865 Order, which “set apart and reserved” the lands, the 
1867 Act declared that they were “set apart reserved and taken.” The High 
Court ruled that the Crown by the latter law annexed the district lands and 
thereby extinguished customary title.360 
The unfavorable dispositions of these cases might seem to make San 
claims to Crown lands in Botswana inauspicious. Such a view is 
unwarranted, however, because there are several features of Britain’s 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 61–62. 
 356. Faulkner v. Tauranga Dist. Council, [1996]1 N.Z.L.R. 357. 
 357. Id. at 361 (citing May 18, 1865 Order in Council). 
 358. Id. (referring to Tauranga District Lands Act of 1867). 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. at 364. There were further considerations as well, relating to the Native Land Court Act of 
1894, but such considerations are not of immediate concern here. 
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acquisition in Botswana that distinguishes it from the New Zealand 
legislation. Although both decisions found such title to be extinguished, 
the latter’s relevant legislation was significantly more explicit. The 
Tauranga legislation, for example, expressly stated that the land was “duly 
and effectually set apart reserved and taken under the said Act as sites for 
settlements for colonization.”361 Similarly, the 1863 legislation in the Te 
Teira Te Paea decision empowered the governor “to take out such district 
lands for settlement and colonization.” It further stated that “these lands 
were to be Crown lands,” and that some aboriginal groups would be 
provided with compensation or made beneficiaries of a trust.362 Such 
specific, targeted efforts to create new uses of land from extinguished 
rights have little in common with announcing that vast sweeps of veld, 
thinly populated and encompassing around 300,000 square kilometers,363 
constitute “Crown lands,” without any further uses, plans, or potential 
beneficiaries divulged. In this regard, one could argue that the 1910 Order, 
in referring generally to “all other lands situate[d] within the limits of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate”364 did not demonstrate a sufficiently “clear 
and plain intention” to extinguish native title.365 
Bishop argues that “aboriginal title . . . survived the change of 
sovereignty in 1910, albeit in somewhat diminished form.”366 Ng’ong’ola, 
taking a more pessimistic view, asserts that “[l]egal title to [San] lands and 
territories passed to the Crown” and the San thus became “tenants at 
will.”367 One could persuasively argue, however, that the 1910 legislation 
did not quash aboriginal title. First, it is reasonable to think that the 
property rights of the San were presumptively retained, following Lord 
Sumner’s statement in the Southern Rhodesia case that “upon a conquest it 
is to be presumed, in the absence of express confiscation or of subsequent 
expropriatory legislation, that the conqueror has respected them or forborn 
to diminish or modify them.”368 Although this presumption is to be applied 
 361. Id. at 361. 
 362. Id. at 364–65 (quoting Teira Te Paea, [1902] AC at 65). 
 363. This figure can be obtained by multiplying Botswana’s current land area (about 582,000 km) 
by 47%. This roughly equaled the amount of Crown land at independence, which had remained largely 
unchanged since the early twentieth century. The 47% figure is taken from Ng’ong’ola, supra note 
141, at 11. 
 364. Supra note 120. 
 365. See, e.g., Te Weehi, 1986(1) N.Z.L.R. at 691–92; Mabo, 197 A.L.R. at 45–46. 
 366. Bishop, supra note 60, at 109. In my view, however, the acquisition of sovereignty would not 
by itself have changed San rights on the current aboriginal title doctrine. Rather, it is the 1910 Order 
vesting Crown lands in the High Commissioner, an exercise of sovereignty, that is cause for concern.  
 367. Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141, at 9–10. 
 368. Southern Rhodesia, 1918 AC at 233. 
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with respect to the acquisition of sovereignty rather than consequent 
exercise of royal prerogative, it is excessively formalistic to infer that the 
Crown could extinguish all rights of the San merely by stating generally 
that all lands within the Protectorate but outside certain specified 
categories would be Crown lands vested in the High Commissioner.  
The Western Australia case provides support for this interpretation. 
The court reviewed the province of Western Australia’s claim that 
aboriginal title had been extinguished during the establishment of the 
colony. The court assessed the lieutenant governor’s proclamation 
announcing that he had the power “to grant unoccupied lands” in the 
territory, and also assessed the regulations governing such grants, which 
allotted land according to the amount invested by the grantee. The court 
additionally examined the colonial administration’s decision to sell all 
lands not already granted or appropriated for public purposes369 and its 
decision that land would be granted to purchasers “‘in free and common 
Soccage yielding and paying . . . a quit-rent of one pepper-corn by the 
year.”370 The court nonetheless found this evidence insufficient to 
demonstrate the extinguishment of aboriginal title. A puzzle also emerges 
from the Mabo case. Regarding the theory of royal prerogative by which 
title supposedly vested in the colonial administration, the court observed 
that:  
the management and control of the waste lands of the Crown were 
passed by Imperial legislation to the respective Colonial 
Governments as a transfer of political power or governmental 
function not as a matter of title . . . . The Imperial Parliament 
retained the sovereign—that is, the ultimate—legislative power over 
colonial affairs, at least until the adoption of the Statute of 
Westminster and it is hardly to be supposed that absolute ownership 
. . . was vested in colonial governments while the ultimate 
 369. Earlier, instructions had been conveyed to the governor as follows: 
And it is Our pleasure that all the waste and uncleared Lands within Our said Territory which 
shall remain after making such reservations as before mentioned for the public Service shall 
be granted in our Name and in our behalf to private persons willing to effect settlements 
thereupon and subject nevertheless to the several rules and conditions hereinafter particularly 
mentioned. 
W. Austl., (1995) 183 C.L.R. at 428 (quoting RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA AND ITS DEVELOPMENT FROM 1829 TO 1979, at 348 (1980)). 
 370. Id. 
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legislative power over that land was retained by the Imperial 
Parliament.371  
The court noted that no such problem would arise with radical title. 
Although the language of the Orders of 1904 and 1910 is difficult to 
reconcile in this regard (the High Commissioner was vested with the lands 
and empowered to make grants and leases) it still raises the question of 
why an absolute, as opposed to radical, title would be vested in the South 
African High Commissioner when the Imperial Parliament presumably 
retained ultimate legislative authority. This is particularly noteworthy in 
view of the absence of a specific acquisition of radical title; that is, if one 
accepts the view that the Crown acquired absolute ownership through the 
1910 Order, one has to explain why there was no antecedent instrument 
imbuing the Crown with radical title. One can point to Sekgome, or to the 
May 1891 legislation, but this would be implausible as neither had any 
direct relation to property issues. 
Ultimately most pertinent, however, is the Mabo case principle that the 
Crown’s appropriations of waste land that are not devoted to inconsistent 
uses are not incompatible with aboriginal title. Given the specificity of the 
issue and the distinctions at stake, it is worth quoting Mabo’s language on 
the matter: 
Where the Crown has validly and effectively appropriated land to 
itself and the appropriation is wholly or partially inconsistent with a 
continuing right to enjoy native title, native title is extinguished to 
the extent of the inconsistency. Thus native title has been 
extinguished to parcels of the waste lands of the Crown that have 
been validly appropriated for use (whether by dedication, setting 
aside, reservation or other valid means) and used for roads, 
railways, post offices and other permanent public works which 
preclude the continuing concurrent enjoyment of native title. Native 
title continues where the waste lands of the Crown have not been so 
appropriated or used or where the appropriation and use is 
consistent with the continuing concurrent enjoyment of native title 
over the land (e.g., land set aside as a national park).372 
This framework could be applied to the present situation. The vesting 
of Crown lands in the High Commissioner represented an appropriation by 
the Crown of land to itself (or, more accurately, the High Commissioner) 
 371. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 38. 
 372. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 50 (emphasis added). 
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but such appropriations by themselves do not extinguish aboriginal title. 
As the conjunctive statement that begins the excerpt makes clear, some 
further inconsistency must exist. Indeed, it would be difficult to make 
sense of the Wik case if matters were otherwise because Wik found that 
grants of pastoral leases of Crown lands did not extinguish aboriginal title. 
Appropriation of the Protectorate Crown lands was not by itself 
inconsistent with the continuing right to enjoy native title, as should be 
evident from Mabo’s explanation of inconsistency, which focuses on 
inconsistencies of use. The appropriation was not made with an eye 
toward specific uses for much of the vast ranges of territory encompassed 
by the 1910 Order. More narrowly, at the time of the issuance of the 
Order, it was not the case that the lands vested were to be used in ways 
precluding the continuing concurrent enjoyment of the San.373 The order 
did not specifically grant or lease any of the Crown lands, nor was it 
accompanied by any legislation doing so. It merely empowered the High 
Commissioner to do so in the future, but such a capacity does not 
represent in itself an inconsistent use, at least on the Mabo framework. 
Whatever problems exist in this regard emerged in the future. Using 
Mabo’s approach, therefore, the mere vesting of the Crown lands in the 
High Commissioner in 1910, without more, did not negate aboriginal title. 
Title was neither extinguished nor diminished, though it was put in a more 
tenuous position. 
The next question is how the post-1910 uses of land affected San title. 
By most accounts, San groups continued to engage in their customary land 
and resources uses after the 1910 Order, and the Order did not have any 
immediate or powerful transformative effect. Ng’ong’ola observes that in 
Crown lands “tribal modes of occupation generally continued without 
perceptible changes,” and that plenty of evidence that San hunting, 
gathering, and foraging continued in this period, notwithstanding changes 
that were slowly taking hold.374 The analysis during the period after 1910 
but before 1966 would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis 
regarding specific territories used by the San and whatever uses were 
established by the Protectorate administration. But it is likely that in many 
situations aboriginal title would be preserved, given the continuing 
practices of San groups during this period. The next major piece of land 
 373. One might also observe that the British did little to modify land rights in any systematic way 
subsequent to the Order and prior to independence. The major exception is the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve, discussed below. It was not until the 1968 Tribal Land Act that further major changes 
occurred systematically. 
 374. See Ng’ong’ola, supra note 141.  
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legislation was the Tribal Land Act of 1968.375 The TLA vested the 
customary rights of tribal chiefs in the district land boards, but it also 
created land boards for the districts with large San populations (such as 
Kgalagadi and Ghanzi). As noted, the Act vested “all rights and title” to 
the land of each tribal reserve in its corresponding land board “in trust and 
for the benefit and advantage of the tribesmen of that area . . . ,” language 
that poses problems for aboriginal title claims regarding lands within tribal 
reserves. Yet, following the case-by-case, contextual approach of Mabo, 
this language should not be construed as automatically extinguishing title. 
It is also imperative to note that the TLA and subsequent amendments 
apply only to tribal lands, not to Crown lands, for example, where many 
San groups reside. Thus, these land reforms would pose no obstacle to 
aboriginal title claims regarding Crown lands. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Botswana's government has distinguished itself from those of many 
other developing countries by its strong record of poverty reduction and 
economic expansion and its support for liberal democracy. It is all the 
more disappointing, therefore, that the same government has made so little 
progress in its relations to indigenous groups and particularly the San. As 
this article has argued, the reasons for this failure are manifold, and stretch 
back into the pre-independence era, when other ethnic groups in Botswana 
were afforded land rights and sovereignty that the San were denied. Until 
they are properly addressed, the historically-entrenched inequities that 
exist between the San and Tswana groups are likely to frustrate or even 
preclude a just resolution of the crisis over the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve and other disputes between the San and the government.  
 375. Supra note 208. 
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